Privacy-Preserving Photo Taking and Accessing for Mobile Phones by Li, Ang
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
Theses and Dissertations
8-2018
Privacy-Preserving Photo Taking and Accessing for
Mobile Phones
Ang Li
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Information Security Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Li, Ang, "Privacy-Preserving Photo Taking and Accessing for Mobile Phones" (2018). Theses and Dissertations. 2915.
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2915
Privacy-Preserving Photo Taking and Accessing for Mobile Phones
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science
by
Ang Li
Henan University
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science, 2010
Peking University
Master of Engineering in Software Engineering, 2013
University of Arkansas
Master of Science in Computer Science, 2017
August 2018
University of Arkansas
This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council
Qinghua Li, Ph.D.
Dissertation Director
Xintao Wu, Ph.D. Susan Gauch, Ph.D.
Committee Member Committee Member
Jingxian Wu, Ph.D.
Committee Member
ABSTRACT
Today, we are living in environments that are full of cameras embedded in devices
such as smart phones and wearables. These mobile devices and as well as apps installed
on them are designed to be extremely convenient for users to take, store and share photos.
In spite of the convenience brought by ubiquitous cameras, users’ privacy may be breached
through photos that are taken and stored with mobile devices. For example, when users take
a photo of a scenery, a building or a target person, a stranger may also be unintentionally
captured in the photo. Such photos expose the location and activity of strangers, and hence
may breach their privacy. In addition, photos that are stored on smartphones may contain
private information (e.g., driver’s license) about phone owners, which raise peoples privacy
concerns over unauthorized access by installed apps.
The goal of this dissertation is to protect people’s privacy in photo taking and access-
ing. To achieve this goal, we propose several systems to address the aforementioned privacy
issues.
To protect stranger’s privacy in photo taking, we proposed two systems called Pri-
vacyCamera and PoliteCamera. Through cooperation between the photographer and the
stranger, these systems can automatically blur the strangers face in the photo upon the
strangers request when the photo is being taken. Even though PrivacyCamera and Polite-
Camera can successfully protect stranger’s privacy, they depend on the cooperation between
the photographer and the stranger. That requires both the photographer and stranger to
install the proposed systems on their mobile phones; however, this is not always possible.
Therefore, we further propose a feature-based model to automatically distinguish the target
from strangers in a photo, so that we can blur all strangers’ faces without the coopera-
tion. Finally, we designed PhotoSafer, a content-based and context-aware to protect private
photos from unauthorized access on Android phones.
In future work, we plan to design a privacy-preserving online sharing system, which
has less burden of policy settings and can protect the privacy of strangers in a photo. In
addition, we will also consider designing personalized systems to protect user-specific private
photos.
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1 Introduction
Today, we are living in environments that are full of cameras embedded in mobile
and wearable devices such as smartphones, tablets, and wearable glasses. These devices are
designed to be extremely convenient for people to capture their daily life, and store those
photos on such devices. However, the development of ethical guidelines and normative stan-
dards of conduct has not caught up with the rapid technological innovation. The prevalent
cameras raise people’s privacy concerns that they may easily enter a physical space where
they can be captured without their consent or awareness. For example, when a user takes
a photo of a beautiful view or a friend using his mobile phone, frequently a stranger is also
accidentally included in the photo, with the face clearly recognizable. Such photos might be
further uploaded to and spread through online social networks, leading to privacy violations
for the captured strangers. Although recent works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] have revealed that pho-
tographers are willing to protect stranger’s privacy, they lack effective tools to achieve this
goal. Indeed, concerns about individual privacy is one of the biggest barriers for the wide
adoption of wearable cameras such as Google Glass.
Another focal concern is that more and more people prefer to store photos on their
mobile phones. These photos may contain some privacy-sensitive (e.g., driver’s license)
information and can be accessed by third-party apps without their consent and awareness.
Even though mobile platforms such as Android provide permission-level access control over
photos, it is still a coarse-grained scheme that either grants the access to all photos or
denies the access to all of them. In order to protect private photos on mobile phones, some
techniques [6, 7, 8] have been developed to control access to those photos. However, existing
solutions either cannot provide real protection or induce high operational complexities for
1
users.
To address above challenges, we also need to consider that mobile devices are resource-
constrained. Due to the limited computing and energy resources, the systems need to be
designed with consideration of computation cost and energy consumption. In addition,
communication and storage overhead should be kept low whenever possible.
1.1 Overview of This Dissertation
The goal of this dissertation is to design mobile systems to protect strangers’ privacy
in photos and protect private photos from unauthorized access by apps. For this purpose,
we propose several mobile systems.
1.1.1 Privacy-Preserving Photo Taking for Mobile Phones
To protect the privacy of strangers accidentally included in photos taken by mobile
phones, we adopt a cooperative privacy protection approach. At the time of taking a photo,
the photographer (via his mobile phone) can automatically notify nearby strangers of the
possible inclusion in the photo via peer-to-peer short-range wireless communications (e.g.,
Wifi Direct [9]). If a stranger does not want to appear in the photo, he can send a request
to the photographer. The photographer will determine whether the requesting stranger is in
the photo or not. If so, the photographer will blur the stranger’s face in the photo.
The challenge is how to determine whether a stranger who requests privacy protection
is in the photo or not. There might be multiple nearby strangers who receive the notification
of potential privacy leakage by the photo. Some of them may request to blur their faces but
others may not request so; some of them are captured in the photo but others are not in the
photo. Hence, it is not trivial to determine if the requesting stranger’s face is in the photo
or not.
2
We design three systems to address this challenge. The first system is PrivacyCam-
era which determines whether a requesting stranger is in the photo or not based on GPS
locations. Specifically, when a stranger requests face blurring, he sends his GPS location to
the photographer. The photographer can then check whether the stranger is in the camera’s
field of view based on their relative locations. However, the effectiveness of PrivacyCamera
is limited by the accuracy of GPS locations and it does not work well indoor due to the
unavailability of GPS. To address this limitation, we design another system named Polite-
Camera which uses facial attributes that do not change frequently (e.g., black hair or blond
hair) to determine whether a stranger is in a photo or not. In particular, a stranger sends his
facial attributes to the photographer in the blurring request. By comparing the stranger’s
facial attributes with the facial attributes of the faces in the photo, the photographer can
determine whether the stranger is in the photo. In addition, we propose heuristic rules to
tell the target of a photo from strangers in the photo, in case the target’s photo also issues
a blurring request.
PrivacyCamera and PoliteCamera rely on the cooperation between the photographer
and the strangers during photo taking. However, such cooperations are not always possi-
ble. For example, the communication channels between the photographer and the stranger
may not be reliable. If the communication channel is disconnected, the blurring request
cannot return to the photographer and the system will fail. To address this limitation, we
adopt another approach where the photographer simply blurs all strangers’ faces. Here the
challenge is to tell the target of a photo from the strangers. To address this challenge, we
design a feature-based model to distinguish the target from the strangers. Specifically, we
propose a set of features, and build a binary classifier based on the features to distinguish
target from strangers. We implement the model based on different supervised learning algo-
rithms and explore their performances. Moreover, we explore how feature selections affect
3
the effectiveness of the approach.
1.1.2 Privacy-Preserving Photo Accessing for Mobile Phones
To protect private photos from unauthorized access while offering friendly user expe-
rience, we design a novel content-based and context-aware private photo protection system
named PhotoSafer for mobile phones. It provides real-time access control over private photos
based on the photo contents and the contextual status of accesses, and discloses the specific
sensitive content that a private photo contains to users before that photo can be accessed.
Our design principle is that a photo should be accessed by an app with users’ aware-
ness and users should be allowed to decide whether the app can access that photo. A naive
approach is to prompt users to check the photo and make a decision every time. However,
this will definitely degrade the usability of the system and apps. To address this problem,
PhotoSafer is designed to be able to automatically check whether the content of photo is
private, and determine whether the user is aware of the app’s access request based on the
contextual status of the phone and the app, e.g., whether the phone is locked or not, and
whether the app is in the foreground or not. To minimize the time needed to identify private
photo content during user operation, PhotoSafer identifies the contents of photos in advance
and caches the results in a database for real-time query. In this way, it can achieve real-time
response to photo access, such that the requesting app’s usability and user experience will
not be affected.
1.2 Organization
The reminder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents our coop-
erative privacy protection system PrivacyCamera. Chapter 3 introduces our facial attributes
based system PoliteCamera for protecting strangers’ privacy in mobile photographing. Chap-
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ter 4 describes our feature-based model for distinguishing the target from the strangers in
photos. Chapter 5 elaborates our content-based and context-aware private photo protection
system PhotoSafer, which provides real-time access control over private photos based on
the photo contents and the contextual status of mobile phone, along with the visibility of
requesting apps. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation and discusses future work.
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2 PrivacyCamera: Cooperative Privacy-Aware Photographing with Mobile
Phones
2.1 Introduction
Mobile phones are usually embedded with powerful cameras today [1]. For example,
iPhone 6 has an 8-megapixel camera. As mobile cameras in the pocket, mobile phones are
increasingly used by people to take photos anywhere and anytime. However, there exist some
privacy issues associated with this convenience. When a user takes a photo of a beautiful
view or a friend using his mobile phone, frequently a stranger is also accidentally included
in the photo, with the face clearly recognizable. Figure 2.1 shows two examples. In Figure
2.1(a), the photographer intends to take a photo of the building but a stranger appears; in
Figure 2.1(b), the photographer intends to picture the target person but a stranger is also
included. In these cases, the photo can reveal the stranger’s location and even activity. For
strangers who do not want to appear in the photo and get their location revealed, being
accidentally included in a photo breaches privacy. Thus, this problem should be addressed.
With the development of image processing technology, there exist several softwares
which can blur faces in a photo, such as Adobe Photoshop and ObscuraCam [2]. However,
none of these commercial softwares can make the stranger in the photo know that he is
included in the photo and give him the right to decide whether to blur his face or not. These
solutions only allow the photographer to make decisions as to blurring the stranger’s face or
not.
A naive solution for protecting stranger’s privacy is that each user stores a pool of
familiar faces (e.g., self, family members and friends) in the phone and the phone simply
blurs all other faces in the photo. However, this solution may cause unnecessary blurring.
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(a) A stranger is in-
cluded when the pho-
tographer pictures a
building
(b) A stranger is in-
cluded when the pho-
tographer pictures a
target person
Figure 2.1: Privacy issues with photos taken by mobile phones (photo by author).
Some strangers may not care about whether they are included in the photo or not. Blurring
their faces is not needed and can unnecessarily degrade the quality of the photo.
In this chapter, we propose a mobile cooperative privacy protection system, called
PrivacyCamera [3], to protect the privacy of a stranger who is accidentally included in a photo
taken by mobile phones. PrivacyCemara can work as an App on both the photographer’s
and the stranger’s mobile phone. At the time of taking a photo, it can automatically notify
nearby strangers of the possible inclusion in the photo via peer-to-peer short-range wireless
communications (e.g., Wifi Direct [4]). If a stranger does not want to appear in the photo, he
can send a request to the photographer. The photographer will determine if the requesting
stranger is in the photo or not. If so, the photographer will blur the stranger’s face in the
photo.
The contribution of this chapter is summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, PrivacyCamera is the first mobile system which can
notify nearby strangers of the possible inclusion in a photo when the photo is being
taken, give them an option to opt out, and blur a stranger’s face upon his request.
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• We design a location-based stranger determination scheme to determine if a stranger is
in the photo or not based on his relative location to the photographer and the heading
direction of the camera, and theoretically analyze its effectiveness.
• We design a Gaussian Blur based face blurring scheme that can smoothly blur a
stranger’s face with minimal negative effect on the quality of a photo.
• We implement a prototype system on Nexus 5 phones, and evaluate the system’s
performance and cost using experiments and field tests.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the design
of PrivacyCamera and theoretical analysis of its performance. Section 2.3 describes the
prototype implementation. Section 2.4 shows evaluation results. Section 2.5 reviews related
work. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.
2.2 System Design
This section describes the design of PrivacyCamera and analyzes its performance.
2.2.1 System Overview
Three types of entities are involved in the system: the photographer who takes photos
using a mobile phone, the target that the photographer intends to picture, and the stranger
who is near the photographer and might be unintentionally included in the photo. The target
can be a building, a natural scenery, a person, etc. The system is proposed for outdoor usage.
The system aims to protect the stranger’s privacy through providing a method for the
stranger to opt out from the photo. Our basic idea is that the photographer notifies nearby
strangers of the possible inclusion in a photo at the time of taking the photo, and blurs a
stranger’s face in the photo upon the stranger’s request. Note that the system does not intend
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to simply blur every stranger’s face in the photo. This is because blurring inevitably affects
the quality of the photo, even though our design adopts an advanced blurring technique to
minimize such effect. To minimize the quality degradation brought to the photo, the system
only blurs a stranger’s face if he requests.
To make the system work, both the photographer and the stranger are required to
install PrivacyCamera (in the form of an App) on their mobile phone. PrivacyCamera relies
on the cooperation between photographers and strangers to protect privacy. Since each mo-
bile phone user can sometimes be a photographer and sometimes a stranger, PrivacyCamera
users essentially cooperatively protect each other’s privacy. It is worthwhile to note that the
paradigm of inter-user cooperation has been successfully adopted in many real-world systems
such as peer-to-peer file downloading systems [5] and online recommender systems [6]. This
success has also motivated our system design. The more users adopt this system, the better
privacy can be protected.
As the first work in this direction, this chapter starts with considering two relatively
simple scenarios:
• Scenario 1: The target of a photo is not a person but something else such as a
building. One stranger is accidentally included in the photo, and he may or may not
want his face to be blurred.
• Scenario 2: The target is a person. One stranger accidentally appears in the photo,
and he may or may not want to blur his face.
Based on our observations, these two scenarios represent a significant portion of photograph-
ing cases although not all of them. Thus, our scheme can enhance privacy in many real-world
scenarios. We will address more complex scenarios in future work.
Even under these two relatively simple scenarios, the problem is still challenging.
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First, there might be multiple strangers nearby who can receive the notification of possible
inclusion in the photo. Some of them may request their faces to be blurred but others may
not request so. Although only one stranger is included in the photo in the two scenarios,
we still need to determine if the stranger in the photo is requesting for face blurring or not,
which is not easy. Second, in Scenario 2, if the stranger in the photo requires face blurring,
we need to make sure that the stranger’s face, not the target’s, is blurred.
For simplicity, photographer is also used to denote the photographer’s mobile phone
when the context is clear. The same applies to stranger.
2.2.2 The Architecture and Workflow of PrivacyCamera
As Figure 2.2 shows, the system consists of four major modules: face detection, blur-
ring request collection, stranger determination and face blurring. When a photographer takes
a photo, the face detection module will run on the captured image. If no face is detected, no
further processing is needed. If any face is detected, the blurring request collection module
sends notifications to nearby strangers using peer-to-peer short-range wireless communica-
tions. If a stranger receiving the notification does not want to be included in the photo,
he sends a blurring request to the photographer. Since this stranger may not necessarily
be included in the photo, to help the photographer determine if this stranger is the one in
the photo, this stranger puts his location (i.e., GPS coordinates) in the request. Then, the
stranger determination module of the photographer will check if the requesting stranger is
in the photo or not based on their relative location and the heading direction of the camera.
If the stranger is in the photo, the face blurring module of the photographer will smoothly
blur his face; otherwise, the request is ignored.
The design of PrivacyCamera is based on several technologies available in off-the-
shelf mobile phones. Face detection can be done using APIs provided by mobile phones,
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Figure 2.2: The architecture of PrivacyCamera.
e.g., the FaceDetector [7] APIs in Android SDK. Peer-to-Peer communications between the
photographer and nearby strangers can be supported by short-range wireless technologies
such as WiFi Direct [4] and Bluetooth which are available on most mobile phones today, e.g.,
Nexus 5. We will introduce how these two modules can be implemented in our prototype
system in Section 2.3. Next, we describe how to determine if a stranger is in the photo and
how to blur faces.
2.2.3 Stranger Determination
This module aims to detect if a stranger who requests face blurring is included in
the photo or not. This is done through checking if the stranger is in the field of view of the
photographer’s camera or not.
This process is illustrated in Figure 2.3. First, we determine the camera’s heading
direction using the orientation sensor embedded in mobile phones. Note that the heading
direction read from compass is in degrees east of Magnetic North instead of True North
(there is a declination angle between the two), and it should be converted in degrees east
of True North (i.e., β in the figure) so as to be in the same coordinate system with GPS
coordinates. Then, we obtain the stranger’s relative direction to the photographer (i.e., α
in the figure) using the GPS coordinates of the stranger and the photographer. Next, we
calculate the relative angle from the stranger to the camera (denoted by δ) as δ = |β − α|.
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Lastly, we determine if the stranger is in the field of view of the camera or not. The horizontal
view angle of the camera (denoted by γ) which specifies the effective horizontal scope of the
camera can be obtained using the API of mobile OS (e.g., GetHorizontalViewAngle() on
Android OS). For example, it is 60 under default focal length for the Nexus 5 phone. If
δ ≤ γ/2, the stranger is in the photo; otherwise, he is not in the photo. 
α 
β γ 
True North 
δ 
Photographer 
Figure 2.3: Detecting if a stranger is in field of view of a camera.
For Scenario 2, it is not enough to determine that the stranger is in the photo. We
also need to tell which face is the target and which is the stranger. To achieve this goal, we
adopt a heuristic approach. We observe from real-life experiences that when we take a photo
of a target person, we usually intentionally make the target’s face larger than anyone else
accidentally included into the photo. For example, if a stranger is too close to the camera
and hence his face is larger than the target’s, the photographer will probably change a facing
direction or ask the target to move a little so that the target is better captured into the
photo than the stranger. Thus in the photo the stranger’s face should be smaller than the
target’s. Based on this, the smaller face will be determined as the stranger in Scenario 2.
2.2.4 Face Blurring
The goal of face blurring is to mask the identifiable features of a face without reducing
the quality of the photo much.
As a preparation step for face blurring, we first need to determine a blurring area
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in the face which encloses the main identifiable features of the face. In this section, we use
a square area as the blurring area. Specifically, we draw the square by setting the middle
point between eyes as the center of the square, and setting the length of a side as 2.4 times
of the distance between eyes. Our tests show that the square drawn in this way can cover
the main identifiable features of a face with the minimum area (see Figure 2.5(a)). Next, we
describe how to blur this square area.
To blur faces smoothly, the Gaussian Blur algorithm [8] is used in this section. The
effect of Gaussian Blur is like viewing an image through a translucent screen. The basic idea
of Gaussian Blur is to adjust the color value of each target pixel (under the RGB color model)
as the weighted average of the color value of itself and other nearby pixels. The weights are
calculated based on Gaussian function such that closer pixels have higher weights. Since
the pixels closer to the target pixel usually have more similar colors with the target pixel
than the pixels farther away, this blurring method can achieve smooth blurring with minimal
effect on photo quality.
Given a target pixel to blur, all the pixels that will be used to blur the target pixel are
enclosed in a circle with radius R and centered in the target pixel. Let C denote this circle.
Let the target pixel be the origin of a two-dimensional coordinate system whose coordinates
are [0, 0]. Then for pixel [x, y] in the circle, where x and y represent the abscissa and the
ordinate of this pixel, its weight is calculated as follows:
w(x, y) =
1
2piσ2
e−
x2+y2
2σ2 (2.1)
where σ is the standard deviation of Gaussian distribution. Let v[x,y](R,G,B) denote the
color values of a pixel [x, y]. Then the blurred color values of the target pixel is computed
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Figure 2.4: An example process of Gaussian Blur for blurring the central pixel.
as follows:
v[0,0](R,G,B) =
∑
[x,y]∈C
v[x,y](R,G,B)
w(x, y)∑
[x,y]∈C w(x, y)
(2.2)
Here, we use a simple example in Figure 2.4(a) to illustrate how a target pixel is
blurred. In this example, there are 9 pixels in an image, and the central pixel is the target
pixel which is marked in red color. The blur radius is set such that only the target pixel and
its direct neighbors are in the circle. The coordinates of the 9 pixels are shown in Figure
2.4(a). The original RGB color values of each pixel is shown in Figure 2.4(b). To conduct
Gaussian Blur, we need to calculate the weight for each pixel by Equation 2.1. Suppose σ
in Equation 2.1 is 1.5. Then the original weight for each pixel computed by Equation 2.1 is
shown in Figure 2.4(c). After that we can calculate the new color values for the target pixel
using Equation 2.2, which are shown in Figure 2.4(d).
For the square blurring area, we can blur each pixel in this square from the leftmost
pixel to the rightmost pixel in each row and row by row using Gaussian Blur. Given a certain
σ, the effect of Gaussian Blur is more intense as the blur radius increases. To fully hide the
identifiable features in the face, a big enough blur radius should be set. Our tests show that
the effect of Gaussian Blur with σ = 3 and R = 30 is good enough to meet our requirement.
Figure 2.5 shows the blur effects under different radius values and fixed σ = 3. It can be
seen that when the blur radius is 30 the face cannot be identified.
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(a) without blurring (b) radius=10
(c) radius=20 (d) radius=30
Figure 2.5: Effect of Gaussian Blur with different radiuses (photo by author).
2.2.5 Analysis on the Effectiveness of Protection
Suppose a stranger is included in a photo and he requests to blur his face. For
the stranger’s face to be really blurred, a precondition is that the stranger determination
module successfully detects the stranger as being in the photo based on the stranger’s claimed
location measured by GPS. Here, we analyze the true protection rate of PrivacyCamera,
which is defined as the percentage of times when the system can successfully detect a stranger
as being in the photo given that the stranger is really in the photo.
The true protection rate depends on a few factors: GPS accuracy r, the horizontal
view angle of the camera γ, the real distance between the stranger and the camera d, and the
real relative angle from the stranger to the camera δ. It actually equals to the probability
that when the stranger is really in the camera’s field of view, its GPS-measured location
is also in the camera’s field of view. If we draw a circle centered at the stranger’s real
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Figure 2.6: Two special cases where δ=0°and r=5 meters.
location with radius r, a true protection happens when the GPS-measured location is within
the intersection between the circle and the view of the camera. The probability is equal
to the fraction of the circle in the intersection (assuming that it is equally likely for the
GPS-measured location to be any point in the circle). Figure 2.6 shows two special cases
when the stranger is directly facing the camera (i.e., δ = 0) and the distances are 5 meters
and 10 meters.
Since r and γ depend on the device, we can consider these two parameters as con-
stants. In fact, we obtained r and γ on Nexus 5 phones (see Section 2.4), which are 5 meters
and 60°, respectively. For simplicity, we use these values in our analysis. Next we analyze
the true protection rate as a function of d and δ.
Generally speaking, given a certain δ, the true protection rate will be higher when d
increases, since longer d can better tolerate the inaccuracy of GPS. Here, we want to find out
the upper bound and lower bound of the true protection rate. Since the effective range of face
detection is 10 meters as shown in Section 2.4.3, the case with d = 10 meters is considered
as the upper bound. The worst case happens when the stranger and the photographer are
at the same location, i.e., d = 0. Besides, we also consider the case with d = 5 meters as a
reference point in the middle, based on our experience that a stranger is more than 5 meters
away from the camera in most cases.
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The true protection rate for the lower bound case is pretty straightforward to derive.
Since γ is 60°, the true protection rate equals to the probability that the GPS-measured
location is within the view of the camera, which is 60
360
= 16.7%.
The true protection rate for the other two cases d = 5 and d = 10 with changing δ
can be deduced using geometry. We omit the detailed process due to the space limitation.
For d = 5 meters, the true protection rate is given in Equation 2.3; for d = 10 meters, the
true protection rate is given in Equation 2.4.
P1 =
1
3
+
h1 ×
√
r2 − h21 + h2 ×
√
r2 − h22
pir2
, (2.3)
where h1 = r × sin(30− δ), h2 = r × sin(30 + δ) and δ ∈ [0, 30].
P2 =
2 arccos
h
r
360
+
h×√r2 − h2
pir2
,
(2.4)
where h = d× sin(30− δ) and δ ∈ [0, 30].
Based on these two equations, we can calculate the theoretical true protection rate for
any specific relative angle δ in these two cases. Figure 2.7 shows the numerical results where
the x-axis is the relative angle δ. The upper bound achieves to 100% when the stranger is
directly facing to the camera (i.e., δ = 0) with the distance of 10 meters. When the stranger
and the photographer stand at the same spot, the true protection rate is 16.7%, which is the
lower bound. For the case with d = 5 meters, the true protection rate decreases from 60%
to 46% when the relative angle increases. When the real distance is between 5 meters and
10 meters, the true protection rate is expected to sit between the red dashed line and the
green dashed line.
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Figure 2.7: True protection rate when the distance from the stranger to the camera is 0
meters, 5 meters, and 10 meters. X-axis is the relative angle δ.
2.3 Implementation
We implemented a prototype system on Nexus 5 phones. The system uses Android
5.1.1 OS and Android 4.3 APIs. This section describes the implementation of major modules.
The face blurring module is implemented as described in Section 2.2.4 and thus not described
in details here.
2.3.1 Face Detection
The face detection module is implemented based on the FaceDetector [7] class pro-
vided in Android SDK. Faces in an image can be detected by calling the findFaces method
of FaceDetector. This method detects faces by finding pupils in the image. The findFaces
method returns a number of detected faces in the image and populate them into an array of
FaceDetector.Faces class [9].
From each instance of the FaceDetector.Faces class, we can obtain the distance be-
tween the two eyes of a face in pixels and the coordinates of the middle point between the
two eyes. As introduced in Section 2.2.4, the face blurring module uses these information to
determine the blurring area for a face.
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2.3.2 Blurring Request Collection
This module enables the photographer to send notifications to nearby strangers, and
enables each stranger to send a blurring request as well as his location to the photographer. In
our prototype, Wifi Direct [4, 10, 11] is used to implement the peer-to-peer communications
between the photographer and the strangers. The photographer first discovers nearby peers
by calling the discoverPeers method of WifiP2pManager system service. Then it sends a
notification to each peer and collects the blurring request from the peer.
Location Acquisition The stranger gets his location using the LocationManager
[12] service. Depending on the device, several technologies can be applied to determine
current location, including GPS and cellular network. In the prototype, we check the avail-
ability of GPS and cellular network in turn. Then, we can find current location by calling
corresponding method of GPS or cellular network. Finally, the longitude and latitude of
current location are obtained.
2.3.3 Stranger Determination
We introduced how to detect if a stranger is in the photo or not in Section 2.2.3.
Here, we describe how to obtain the parameters used in that approach (see Figure 2.3) on a
phone.
The camera’s heading direction (β in Figure 2.3) can be obtained by reading sensor
data from gyroscope embedded in Android phones. However, the returned value is in degrees
east of Magnetic North instead of True North. To be in the same coordinate system with
GPS coordinates, we convert it to be in degrees east of True North by adding the declination
angle between Magnetic North and True North. The declination angel can be obtained by
calling the native method in Android APIs.
We can obtain the relative direction from the stranger to the photographer (α in
20
Figure 2.3) by calling the bearingTo method of the Location object, passing in the stranger’s
current location. Since the original bearing value returned from bearingTo is within the
range from negative 180°to positive 180°, we normalize it to be within the range from 0°to
360°.
With the camera’s heading direction and the relative direction from the stranger to
the photographer, we can easily calculate the relative angle δ in Figure 2.3 and normalize it
to be within 0°and 180°.
The horizontal view angle of the camera γ in Figure 2.3 can be obtained by calling
the getHorizontalViewAngle method of the Camera.Parameters object. In our current proto-
type, only the rear-facing camera without zooming in and zooming out has been considered.
However, the value with zooming in and zooming out can be obtained similarly, and our
general approach is applicable to those cases as well.
2.4 Evaluations
2.4.1 Experimental Methodology
The experiments are conducted outdoors on our campus and under fine weather.
Figure 2.8 shows two typical scenes of experiments. In our experiments, standard GPS
instead of assisted GPS (A-GPS) [13] is used for location acquisition since A-GPS has lower
accuracy. Before conducting each test, we wait around 30 seconds to make sure that the GPS
receiver is able to get the latest location information. Also, each test is done at a different
location. In addition, we do not zoom in and zoom out the rear-facing camera, and just use
the default focal length.
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Figure 2.8: Experiment scene (photo by author).
2.4.2 GPS Accuracy Test
As GPS is used to determine the location of strangers, the accuracy of location
obtained from the GPS receiver of a phone is an important factor that determines the
performance of the system. The accuracy level of GPS may vary from tens of meters to
millimeters [14]. The actual accuracy depends on many factors, such as sky blockage, receiver
quality and atmosphere condition [15]. For high-quality consumer-grade GPS receivers, the
accuracy can be within 5 meters under the open sky and 10 meters under closed canopies
[16].
To examine the accuracy of GPS receivers on mobile phones, we conduced 100 tests
at different locations. Each test calls the getAccuracy method of the Location object in
Android to get an approximate accuracy at the current location in meters. The approximate
accuracy is defined in the following way: if we draw a circle with the center at the current
location and the radius equal to the accuracy, there is a 68% possibility that the true location
is inside the circle. The test results are shown in Figure 2.9. The average accuracy is about
5 meters, and in the 66% of the tests the accuracy is no more than 5 meters.
2.4.3 Face Detection Test
This part evaluates the effectiveness of the face detection module in detecting faces in
a photo. Considering that the strength of light might affect detection, we conducted tests in
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Figure 2.10: Face detection under different lighting conditions (photo by author).
the morning, at noon and in the evening. As shown in Figure 2.10, even under dark lighting
conditions, the face detection module can effectively detect the face in photos. Additionally,
we changed the locations of the person to be detected within the field of view of the camera.
Specifically, since the horizontal view angle of Nexus 5 is 60°, we did tests when the relative
angel from the person to the camera (δ in Figure 2.3) is 0°, 10°, 20°and 30°. The results show
that faces can be successfully detected when the distance between the person and the camera
is within 10 meters at any relative angles, but cannot be detected when the distance is over
11 meters. When the distance is between 10 meters and 11 meters, faces can sometimes be
detected.
2.4.4 Accuracy of Protection
This part evaluates the effectiveness of our system in protecting the stranger’s privacy.
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True Protection Rate for Scenario 1
This group of tests considers Scenario 1 where one stranger appears in the photo.
Suppose the stranger wants to blur his face. We evaluate the true protection rate. In our
tests, the stranger stands 5 meters and 10 meters away from the camera. The stranger and
the photographer are positioned in ways such that the relative angle between the stranger
and the camera’s heading direction (δ in Figure 2.3) is 0°(i.e., the camera directly faces the
stranger), 15°and 30°. The camera’s heading direction is randomly set in each test. If the
relative angle calculated by the stranger determination module is no more than 30°, the
stranger is successfully detected as being in the image and his face is blurred. Figure 2.11(a)
shows an example where the stranger’s face is successfully blurred.
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show the true protection rates when the distance is 5 meters
and 10 meters respectively. In each table, we also show the relative angles calculated by
the stranger determination module to provide more information. In both cases, the true
protection rate decreases when the relative angle increases, i.e., when the stranger is closer
to the edge of the camera’s view. The true protection rate is higher when the distance is 10
meters than when it is 5 meters, because longer distance can better tolerate the inaccuracy
of GPS location. Moreover, we can find that these test results are consistent with our
theoretical analysis shown in Figure 2.7.
False Protection Rate For Scenario 1
Suppose in Scenario 1, the stranger in the photo (denoted by A) does not request to
blur his face. However, another nearby stranger B who is not in the photo may submit a
blurring request. In this case, we define false protection rate as the percentage of times when
the stranger B not in the photo is mistakenly detected as being in the photo and stranger A’s
face is hence falsely blurred. In the tests, stranger B and the photographer are positioned
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Table 2.1: True Protection Rate for Scenario 1 When d = 5 Meters
Test
Relative angle to camera
0° 15° 30°
Test 1 20° 2° 15°
Test 2 8° 41° 20°
Test 3 17° 3° 22°
Test 4 12° 60° 16°
Test 5 40° 18° 54°
Test 6 34° 13° 41°
Test 7 37° 49° 39°
Test 8 18° 17° 29°
Test 9 20° 37° 44°
Test 10 23° 24° 61°
True Protection Rate 70% 60% 50%
Table 2.2: True Protection Rate for Scenario 1 When d = 10 Meters
Test
Relative angle to camera
0° 15° 30°
Test 1 23° 18° 29°
Test 2 3° 19° 2°
Test 3 8° 39° 44°
Test 4 7° 46° 38°
Test 5 5° 22° 35°
Test 6 0° 34° 21°
Test 7 22° 17° 46°
Test 8 21° 2° 25°
Test 9 19° 15° 29°
Test 10 31° 25° 17°
True Protection Rate 90% 70% 60%
in ways such that the relative angle from stranger B to the camera (δ in Figure 2.3) is 30°,
60°, 90°, 120°, 150°and 180°. If the relative angle calculated by the stranger determination
module is no more than 30°, stranger B is falsely detected as being in the photo. Table
2.3 and Table 2.4 show the results when the distance between B and the photographer is
5 meters and 10 meters respectively. Similar to the true protection rate case, the relative
angles calculated by the stranger determination module are also shown. We can see that
the false protection rate decreases when the relative angle increases and when the distance
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increases which is reasonable.
We further evaluate the false protection rate in a more noisy environment, where
there are five strangers like stranger B in the above test who are not in the photo but
submit a blurring request. In this case, we define false protection rate as the percentage of
times when anyone of these five strangers not in the photo is mistakenly detected as being in
the photo and stranger A’s face is hence falsely blurred. In this group of tests, the distance
between strangers and the photographer is between 5 and 10 meters, and the relative angle
from strangers to the camera is within 30°to 90°. All the strangers’ locations are randomly
selected within these ranges. Over 20 independent tests, the false protection rate is as low
as 10%.
Table 2.3: False Protection Rate for Scenario 1 When d = 5 Meters
Test
Relative angle to camera
30° 60° 90° 120° 150° 180°
Test 1 15° 28° 87° 82° 138° 169°
Test 2 20° 35° 72° 95° 179° 171°
Test 3 22° 42° 73° 83° 165° 178°
Test 4 16° 74° 63° 94° 147° 174°
Test 5 54° 77° 67° 147° 124° 159°
Test 6 41° 72° 58° 136° 178° 167°
Test 7 39° 63° 78° 127° 175° 192°
Test 8 29° 65° 79° 121° 179° 203°
Test 9 44° 82° 97° 123° 160° 163°
Test 10 61° 79° 50° 138° 158° 168°
False Protection Rate 50% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0%
True Protection Rate for Scenario 2
The true protection rate for Scenario 2 depends on two factors. One factor is the true
protection rate for Scenario 1, and the other factor is the accuracy of correctly telling the
stranger’s face from the target’s face. We first ran tests to evaluate the accuracy of correctly
telling the stranger’s face from the target’s. In our tests, the stranger stands farther from
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Table 2.4: False Protection Rate for Scenario 1 When d = 10 Meters
Test
Relative angle to camera
30° 60° 90° 120° 150° 180°
Test 1 29° 71° 110° 146° 127° 169°
Test 2 2° 83° 113° 135° 144° 171°
Test 3 44° 82° 118° 157° 142° 178°
Test 4 38° 75° 99° 126° 138° 174°
Test 5 35° 41° 102° 137° 129° 159°
Test 6 21° 65° 99° 140° 136° 167°
Test 7 46° 82° 97° 128° 131° 192°
Test 8 25° 56° 98° 156° 168° 203°
Test 9 29° 68° 86° 117° 152° 163°
Test 10 17° 76° 83° 105° 149° 168°
False Protection Rate 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
(a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 2
Figure 2.11: Field test (photo by author).
the camera than the target as assumed in Section 2.2.3. They do not stand in a line so
that both of their faces appear in the photo. To make sure both faces can be detected,
we keep them within 10 meters from the camera. Over 20 tests, we found that the system
can always successfully tell the stranger’s face. Figure 2.11(b) shows an example where the
stranger’s face is successfully blurred without affecting the target person. As a result, the
true protection rate in Scenario 2 should be the same as that of Scenario 1.
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Table 2.5: Running Time of Blurring Faces
Distance
Blur Radius
10 20 30
5 meters 4ms 7ms 13ms
10 meters 2ms 4ms 7ms
2.4.5 Cost Evaluation
Communication Delay
This part evaluates the round-trip delay from the time the photographer sends out
a notification to the time he receives a request from the stranger. In the tests the stranger
stands 5 meters and 10 meters away from the camera, and 10 tests were run for each distance.
The average delays are 188ms and 193ms when the distance is 5 meters and 10 meters,
respectively. Hence, the communication delay is short.
Running Time of Blurring Faces
This part evaluates the time needed to blur a face on a mobile phone. Two factors
affect the time, the distance from the stranger to the camera and the blur radius of Gaussian
Blur. The distance has an effect since it affects the size of the blurring area. If the blur
radius is larger, more computations are needed for blurring each pixel of the blurring area.
In these tests, we set the distance as 5 meters and 10 meters, and set the blur radius as 10,
20 and 30. Table 2.5 shows the results, where each data point is the average of 5 tests. When
the distance increases, the running time decreases. This is because longer distance means
smaller face in the photo and hence smaller blurring area. When blur radius increases, the
time increases due to the higher computation load. In all these cases, the running time of
blurring faces is very small.
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Power Consumption
To measure the power consumption of our system on the phone, we utilize a widely
used App called PowerTutor [17] which can accurately monitor the power consumption of
different Apps. We compare the consumption of our system with Google Maps and Chrome.
First, to evaluate our power consumption when no photos are taken, we tested these
Apps running in the background for 5 minutes. Table 2.6 shows their average power con-
sumption. It can be seen that PrivacyCamera consumes much lower power than the other
two Apps.
Table 2.6: Power Consumption When Running in the Background
Google Maps Chrome PrivacyCamera
Average Power (mW) 25 32 10
Then we measure the power consumption of one conversation between the photog-
rapher and the stranger (including sending notification and receiving blurring request) and
blurring one face on the phone. For comparison, we also measured the power consumption
of visiting one web page in Chrome and searching for one location in Google Maps. Table
2.7 shows the results, where each data point is the average result of 10 tests. In our system,
each communication conversation only consume 0.12J, which is the lowest among the tested
operations. The power consumption of blurring one face is 7.5J. Based on this number, a
fully-charged battery (3.8V, 2300 mAh) of Nexus 5 phone can support the blurring of 4195
faces before being depleted. Thus, the power consumption is low. We noticed that the power
consumption for blurring one face is higher than visiting one web page and searching one
location. However, users usually do not take photos as often as they visit web pages and
searching locations. Thus, we expect that the overall power consumption of PrivacyCamera
should be lower than Chrome in practice.
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Table 2.7: Power Consumption When Running in the Foreground
Test Application Operation Average Energy Usage(J)
Google Maps Search for 1 location 2.4
Chrome Visit 1 web page 1.4
PrivacyCamera Conduct 1 conversation 0.12
PrivacyCamera Blur 1 face 7.5
2.5 Related Work
Jung and Philipose [18] propose a method to protect video privacy. The wearable
camera will stop recording a person when it detects that the person is making certain ges-
tures, e.g., waving hands. MarkIt [19] detects the sensitive objects predefined by users in
videos and covers the sensitive objects with markers before releasing the video to third-party
applications. Jana et al. [20] design an OS abstraction Recognizer to enforce fine-grained
access control in augmented reality system. It can reduce the quality of raw sensor data
when third-party applications request to access it. A similar system is SemaDroid [21]. Jana
et al.[22] implement a privacy protection layer to restrict untrusted applications to access
input data from perceptual sensors. For example, a person’s face sketch can be transformed
depending on different privacy levels.
Schiff et al. [23] propose a system to detect persons that wear special tracking markers
and block their faces from photos. However, people must wear special markers beforehand
which does not apply to our considered problem. Bo et al. [24] design a protocol to protect
the privacy of people being photographed based on people’s privacy desires, which are con-
tained in a physical tag. In their approach, however, people are required to wear clothes with
QR-code as privacy tags. Wang et al. [25] propose an approach to protect people’s privacy
based on the recognition of their visual fingerprints in images or videos, including motion
patterns and visual appearance (e.g., clothing color). However, it requires people to upload
their visual fingerprints to the server whenever their visual fingerprints such as clothing are
30
changed, which needs intensive intervention by people. Moreover, their approach relies on
a server to do the detection which does not fit our scenario. Templeman et al. [26] prevent
private images from being shared with others based on attributes extracted from the image
such as location and content. PlaceAvoider [27] is a system that can notify the photographer
when an application is going to capture images in sensitive areas (e.g., bedroom). Pidcock
et al. [28] propose a system to notify bystanders of nearby mobile sensing activities. Tan
et al.[29] propose a system to protect photo privacy in Android phones. The system can
recognize the photos that contain persons known to the phone owner, and denies third-party
applications to access these photos. However, none of the above approaches can be applied
to protect stranger’s privacy in our scenarios.
2.6 Summary
We designed a system PrivacyCamera to protect strangers’ privacy who are acciden-
tally included in a photo taken by mobile phones. The system can notify nearby strangers of
the possible inclusion in a photo and allow them to decide if to blur their faces in the photo.
We designed techniques to detect if a stranger requesting face blurring in in the photo or not
based on GPS locations. We implemented a prototype system, and evaluated the system’s
performance and cost through experiments as well as field tests. Evaluations show that the
system can accurately detect the stranger and blur his face to protect his privacy.
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3 PoliteCamera: Respecting Strangers’ Privacy in Mobile Photographing
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays mobile phones usually have built-in cameras that facilitate capturing pho-
tos. For instance, iPhone 7 is embedded with a 12-megapixel camera [1]. However, an
increasing privacy concern has arisen as more and more pictures are taken in people’s daily
lives. When a user takes a photo of a scenery or a friend with a mobile phone, it is likely that
a stranger can also be accidentally included in the photo, with the face clearly recognizable.
Fig. 3.1 illustrates two examples. In Fig. 3.1(a), the building is the target but a stranger
is captured; in Fig. 3.1(b), the photographer intends to picture the target person but two
strangers are accidentally included. In these examples, the photo can breach the stranger’s
privacy by revealing the stranger’s location and activity. Thus strangers privacy should be
protected.
(a) A stranger
is included when
the photographer
pictures a building.
(b) Two strangers
are included when
the photographer
pictures a target
person.
Figure 3.1: Privacy issues with photos taken by mobile phones (photo by author).
Several recent works have been done to protect strangers privacy in photos through
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blurring their faces. They differ in the way of determining whether a stranger is in the photo
or not. Our proposed PrivacyCamera [5] in Chapter 2 checks whether a stranger is in a photo
or not based on GPS locations of the photographer and the stranger. Due to the dependence
on GPS location, it does not work well indoor due to the unavailability or inaccuracy of
GPS. He et al. [6] design a system for protecting photo privacy that identifies a stranger in a
photo by recognizing his motion patterns and visual appearance (e.g., clothes color) profiled
into the system in advance. However, users’ visual fingerprints need to be updated whenever
they change (e.g., changing clothes), which is not convenient. Zhang et al. [7] propose a
server-based system to protect privacy of photographed users that compares the portrait of a
user uploaded to the server and the portrait of the persons included in photos. Their scheme
considers full portrait captured in the photo (i.e., the whole body), which is quite different
from this chapter that only considers face. Also, their scheme assumes a trusted server from
the privacy perspective, which is not always available.
In this chapter, we use facial attributes that do not change frequently (e.g., black
hair or blond hair) to determine whether a stranger is in a photo or not. Since such facial
attributes are relatively stable, if a person is in a photo, by comparing the faces in the photo
with his recent profile photo in facial attributes, the person can be correctly matched to
his face in the photo. Also, in photographing scenarios, it is not very likely that the facial
attributes of two nearby strangers are exactly same, since the number of persons in a limited
geographic area around the photographer is usually not large. That means if facial attributes
can be accurately identified from photos, mismatch between faces and strangers will be of
a low chance. Thus intuitively facial attribute-based face-stranger matching is a promising
method to explore.
Based on facial attributes, we design a cooperative scheme PoliteCamera [8] to protect
the privacy of strangers who are unintentionally included in photos taken by mobile phones.
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PoliteCamera works as an application on the mobile phones for both the photographer and
the stranger. When a photographer takes a photo, he (via the mobile phone) will notify
nearby strangers of the potential risk of being included in the photo via peer-to-peer short-
range wireless communications (e.g., WiFi Direct [9]). If a stranger prefers not to be included
in the photo, he can send a blurring request to the photographer together with his facial
attributes included in the request. The photographer will check whether the requesting
strangers face appears in the photo or not based on the facial attributes sent from the
stranger and the facial attributes of faces captured in the photo. If the attributes of a face in
the photo match those of the requesting stranger, that face is considered to be the stranger’s
and it will be blurred in the photo.
The set of facial attributes will be carefully selected so that a combination of attribute
values is specific enough to differentiate different strangers nearby the photographer but is
not specific enough to uniquely identify who the requesting stranger is in the real world.
The number of possible attribute value combinations should be reasonably large (e.g., tens
of thousand). Then the probability for two different strangers to have the same combination
is low, since the number of strangers around a photographer is usually small. The number of
possible combinations should also not be too large. In this way, each combination could be
owned by many people in the real world, and thus cannot be used to infer who the stranger is.
As described later, approximate match instead of exact match will be used in PoliteCamera,
which makes linking multiple appearances of the same person difficult. Thus, the privacy risk
of re-identification will be low. Moreover, privacy-preserving computing technologies can also
be applied to complete the matching of facial attributes without sending the stranger’s facial
attributes to the photographer in cleartext, and in this way further protect the stranger’s
facial attributes from the photographer (see Section 3.2.4 for a discussion).
The privacy protection offered by PoliteCamera is based on the cooperation between
37
photographers and strangers. Although these two roles are separately discussed, real-world
users can take either role in different scenarios. Since every user can be a stranger in many
scenarios, users have a motivation to use this system, and participation in this system means
mutually protecting each others privacy and benefiting everyone including self. This inter-
user cooperation design is also motivated by many real-world systems such as collaborative
filtering recommender systems [10] and peer-to-peer video streaming systems [11]. Users’
privacy can be better protected when more people use this system. Although it is not a
perfect solution for the problem, it still significantly advances the state of the art in this
domain.
The contribution of this chapter is summarized as follows:
• We propose a facial attribute-based system PoliteCamera for protecting strangers’
privacy in mobile photographing. To the best of our knowledge, PoliteCamera is the
first scheme that makes nearby strangers aware of possible inclusion in a photo when
the photo is being taken, allowing them to determine whether to blur their face in the
photo or not, and protects strangers’ privacy under both indoor and outdoor scenarios,
without using any trusted server, human gesture, or special wearables.
• We design a novel adapted balanced convolutional neural network (ABCNN) that can
simultaneously predict multiple facial attributes from a photo, and use it to determine
the existence of requesting strangers in a photo.
• To avoid identifying the real target persons of a photo as a stranger, a heuristic ap-
proach is employed to effectively filter targets to prevent incorrect blurring.
• The proposed system is implemented, and extensively evaluated on real datasets and
in the field. Experimental results show the excellent performance of the system.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the design of
PoliteCamera. Section 3.3 presents implementation. Section 3.4 shows evaluation results.
Section 3.5 reviews related work. Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.
3.2 System Design
This section describes the design of PoliteCamera.
3.2.1 System Overview
Three types of entities are involved in the system: the photographer who takes a
photo, the target who is intentionally captured by the photographer, and the stranger who
is near the target and might be accidentally included in the photo.
The system is designed to protect the stranger’s privacy by giving an option to the
stranger to opt out from the photo. The general idea is that the system notifies nearby
strangers the possible inclusion in a photo, and blurs a stranger’s face if the stranger sends
a blurring request. A naive approach is to blur every stranger’s face in the photo. However,
this is not an ideal solution, since blurring will inevitably affect the quality of the photo. To
minimize the effect on photo quality, our design only blurs a stranger’s face if he requests to
do so. We assume PoliteCamera is installed on both the photographers and the stranger’s
mobile phone. Each user of PoliteCamera provides one of his photos to the PoliteCamera
app upon the installation of the system. Each users facial attributes are learned from this
base photo and stored in the system for future use. (The base photo can be updated by
the user but this does not need to be done frequently since facial attributes do not change
frequently.) When a stranger requests a photographer to blur his face, he can send these
attributes to the photographer and the photographer will determine whether his face is in
the photo based on these facial attributes and blur his face if so.
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There are two challenges with the approach. Firstly, there might be multiple nearby
strangers who receive the notification of potential privacy leakage by the photo. Some of them
may request to blur their faces but others may not request so. Hence, we need to determine
if the requesting strangers face is in the photo or not, which is not trivial. Secondly, when
the target is a single person or multiple persons, we need to keep the target unblurred even
if the target’s phone mistakenly sends out a blurring request. Telling the target from the
stranger is necessary but difficult.
3.2.2 The Architecture and Workflow of PoliteCamera
As Fig. 3.2 shows, the system consists of six major modules: face detection and pre-
processing, blurring request and collection, facial attributes classifier, target filter, stranger
determination and face blurring. When a photographer takes a photo, the face detection
module will run on the captured image. If any face is detected, the notification of possible
inclusion in the photo will be sent to nearby strangers via peer-to-peer short-range wireless
communications. If a stranger would like to blur his face in the photo, he sends a blurring
request to the photographer. To help the photographer determine if the requesting stranger
is in the photo, this stranger also sends his pre-computed facial attributes (e.g., gender,
obtained from his face image when initializing the PoliteCamera app). Upon receiving blur-
ring requests, the photographer crops all the faces in the picture, and then feed them into
the pre-trained facial attributes classifier. By comparing the facial attributes of request-
ing strangers and the attributes of detected faces in the photo, the stranger determination
module of photographer can identify those requesting strangers captured in the photo. If a
requesting stranger is in the photo, the face blurring module of the photographer smoothly
blurs the corresponding face; otherwise, the request is ignored. In case the target mistakenly
sends a blurring request, the target filter module distinguishes the target from the stranger
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Figure 3.2: The architecture of PoliteCamera.
based on specific defined rules, and keeps the target unblurred in the photo.
The design of PoliteCamera depends on several available technologies in mobile
phones. In particular, face detection and preprocessing can be implemented using APIs
provided by the operating system on mobile phones, such as the FaceDetector APIs in An-
droid SDK. Similarly, peer-to-peer short-range wireless communications can be set up by
available technologies on most modern mobile phones, such as WiFi Direct [9] and Blue-
tooth. We will introduce the implementation of these two modules in Section 3.3. Next, we
will illustrate more details about the rest four modules.
3.2.3 Facial Attribute Classifier
Given an input face image in pre-defined dimensions, this module aims to simulta-
neously output a set of facial attributes associated with this input image. In particular,
each facial attribute is a binary label, where +1 indicates the presence of the corresponding
attribute, and -1 means its absence. In this chapter, we propose to train a facial attribute
classifier through the ABCNN model where a weighted objective function is constructed to
maximize the prediction accuracy.
Formally, let I be the set of input images, and N be the number of facial attributes.
For a given image x ∈ I, let yi ∈ {−1,+1} be the binary label of the ith attribute, where
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is the index of facial attributes. Let H be the hypothesis space of pos-
sible decision functions, and fi(θ
Tx) be the decision function, where θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θN}
is the network weights. Hence, the loss function of the ith facial attribute can be defined
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as Li(fi(θ
Tx), yi). Let E(Li) be the expected loss over the range of inputs I. Then the
optimization task is to minimize the expected squared error for each attribute.
∀i : fi = arg min
fi∈H
E(Li) (3.1)
For each input x and attribute i, the corresponding classification result ci(x) and the ac-
cording accuracy acci(x) can be obtained from the output of fi(x) described as:
ci(x) =

+1 fi(x) > 0
−1 otherwise,
and
acci(x, y) =

+1 yi(x)ci(x) > 0
0 otherwise
(3.2)
As discussed above, the traditional approach treats facial attributes as N independent
tasks, and each classifier is trained independently. The typical loss function for the ith facial
attribute is constructed by choosing the hinge-loss function, which is shown as:
arg min
θi
Li(fi(θ
Tx), yi) = arg min
θi
(max(0, 1− yi(x)fi(θTx))) (3.3)
However, a problem with the traditional approach is that training independent classi-
fiers cannot learn the latent correlations between attributes. To exploit such correlations, the
classifier should be constructed to learn all of these facial attributes simultaneously. In addi-
tion, the attribute label distribution in the training set should match with the corresponding
distribution in the testing set. Therefore, it is necessary to balance the dataset to train a
better classifier. One way to obtain a balanced dataset is to perfectly collect evenly dis-
tributed dataset of images for each attribute. However, it will cause extra efforts since most
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of data in real application is not evenly distributed, and finding such dataset may be very
challenging especially at a large scale. An alternative solution is to modify the loss function
in order to simulate a balanced dataset. In our proposed ABCNN, some changes are made
to the objective function to address the imbalance between the training dataset and the test
dataset. Specifically, a mixed objective function is proposed by considering the distribution
difference between training data and testing data as adapted weights. Firstly, the training
distribution Si for each attribute i is computed by calculating the fraction of positive samples
Train+i (0 < Train
+
i < 1) and fraction of negative samples Train
−
i (0 < Train
−
i < 1) in
the training set. Given the binary testing target distribution Target+i and Target
−
i (where
Target+i +Target
−
i = 1), an adapted weight is assigned for each class of attribute i, as shown
in Eq. 3.4 and Eq. 3.5:
p(i|+ 1) = 1 + ∆T
+
Target+i + Train
+
i
(3.4)
p(i| − 1) = 1 + ∆T
−
Target−i + Train
−
i
(3.5)
where ∆T+ = Target+i − Train+i and ∆T− = Target−i − Train−i . It can be seen from the
above equations that we will increase the weight of the ith facial attribute if the fraction of
positive or negative labels in the training data is less than the testing data. The intuition
is that the increment of those weights will help balance the distribution difference between
training data and testing data. Correspondingly, we will decrease the fraction weights of
positive or negative labels in the training data if it is higher than that in the testing data.
Then, these adapted weights are incorporated into the mixed objective function. Instead
of using the hinge-loss function, a weighted mixed task square error is adopted as the loss
function, and the optimization problem of ABCNN can be expressed as:
∀i : arg min
fi∈H
E(L(x, y)) = arg min
fi∈H
E(
∑N
i=1 p(i|yi(x))||fi(x)− yi(x)||2) (3.6)
43
The optimization problem aims to find the optimal decision function f that has the smallest
error between predictions and target labels. Over an M -element training set X with labels
Y, from Eq. (6) we can get:
∀i : arg min
fi∈H
E(L(X, Y )) = arg min
fi∈H
E(
∑M
j=1
∑N
i=1 p(i|Yji(x))||fi(Xj)− Yji||2) (3.7)
The ABCNN architecture can be built by replacing the standard loss layer of a deep
convolution neural network (DCNN) with a layer implementing Eq. 3.7. After the above
classifier is trained, we can predict facial attributes by inputing a face image with fixed
dimensions (which are consistent with that of training images) to the classifier.
3.2.4 Stranger Determination
This module aims to determine if a requesting stranger is included in the photo or
not and which face matches the stranger. This is done though thresholding the difference
between the facial attributes of the detected faces and those of the requesting stranger.
In fact, facial attributes predicted by the classifier is a vector of binary values, where +1
indicates the presence of the corresponding attribute, while −1 represents its absence. The
difference is defined as the number of different attributes between two faces under the same
set of attributes. Formally, let N be the number of attributes associated with a face. For
a given face, its corresponding attributes vector V = [a1, . . . , aN ], where ai ∈ {−1,+1}
represents the ith facial attribute. We use Vr and Vs to represent the facial attributes of the
requesting stranger and a specific detected face respectively. The inner product of Vr and
Vs is Vr·Vs =
∑N
i=1 Vr[i]Vs[i]. If all the attributes are identical that inner product should be
N . The Vr[i]Vs[i] is −1 only when the ith attribute in Vr and the ith attribute in Vs are
different. Hence, the difference can be obtained as:
diff =
N − Vr·Vs
2
(3.8)
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As discussed before the facial attributes cannot be used to uniquely identify a stranger.
In order to further protect the stranger’s facial attributes from the photographer, inner
product computation can be done with a two-party privacy-preserving scheme [12]. Usually
the predication results from two images from the same person cannot match exactly due
to angle difference or some other reasons. Thus a threshold is set to tolerate such minor
deviations. The rule is that only the difference between facial attributes of the requesting
stranger and any specific detected face is less than or equal to the threshold, we consider
the detected face belongs to the requesting stranger. Our evaluations show that it is a good
choice to set 1 as the threshold.
3.2.5 Target Filter
This module is designed to distinguish the target from the stranger in a photo, so
that the target’s face will not be blurred even if the target mistakenly sends a blurring
request. Specifically, if the target of a photo is one or multiple persons, the task is filtering
out the targeted faces; if the target is a building or something else, we would like to avoid
the stranger being mistakenly identified as the target. Therefore, a heuristic approach is
proposed to achieve this goal. Based on our observations from real-world experience, the
target is usually associated with the following properties in the photo:
• One common goal of taking photos is recording beautiful moments. The target is likely
to be smiling when he is being pictured, since smiles make a person more attractive
and confident.
• The photographer usually intentionally makes the target’s face significantly larger than
others who are accidentally included in the photo. For instance, if a stranger is too
close to the camera and hence his face is larger than the target’s, the photographer will
usually stop picturing or move a little bit so that the target is better captured into the
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photo. Moreover, considering that there might be multiple targets appearing in the
photo but with slightly different face sizes (e.g., a group of people taking a picture), we
expect to filter all targets in the photo by comparing a detected face with the largest
face in the photo, which is considered as one of the targets’ faces by default. If the size
difference is less than a pre-defined threshold, we consider the detected face as one of
the target faces.
• Similarly, the photographer usually puts the target in a dominant position of the photo.
The central region is one of the most popular options, which can highlight the target
in the photo.
Consequently, smiling, face size and face position can facilitate determining if a
face belongs to the target or not. Based on these observations, we propose three rules to
determine whether a person in the photo is a target or not.
1. The person is smiling.
2. The person’s face is the largest one in the photo or slightly smaller than the largest one
by a pre-defined threshold. Based on our test, we find that the average size difference
between two targets’ faces in a photo is around 10%. Hence, if more than one face is
detected, we compare the largest one with the others. If the size difference between
the largest one and a certain face is less than or equal to 10%, we consider that face
as one target face. Otherwise, the detected face will not be treated as a target.
3. The person’s face appears at the central region of the photo. The central region is
defined as the middle section of horizontal trisections of a photo.
However, it is too strict if we determine a detected face is the target only when all those three
rules are satisfied, since sometimes not all of them are satisfied. For instance, the target is
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not always smiling when the photo is taken. Considering this, we determine that the face is
the target if at least two of the three rules are satisfied.
3.2.6 Face Blurring
The purpose of face blurring is to mask the features of a face in order to make the
face not recognizable, without degrading the quality of photo much. Similar to our previous
work [5], we adopt an approach based on the Gaussian Blur algorithm [13] to smoothly blur
faces. To conduct face blurring, we need to determine a blurring area in the face enclosing
the main identifiable features of the face. In particular, we draw a square whose side length
is 2.4 times of the distance between eyes, and whose center is the middle point between eyes.
Then the Guassian Blur operation can be performed in the square blurring area.
3.3 Implementation
The facial attribute classifier was implemented using Python 2.7 and MxNet [14],
which is an open-source deep learning framework. WiFi Direct was used to conduct peer-to-
peer communications between the stranger and the photographer. The face blurring module
was implemented as same as our previous work [5], so some details are omitted here.
3.3.1 Face Detection and Preprocessing
Face detection is based on the FaceDetector class provided in Android SDK. Faces
in an image can be detected by calling the findFaces method of FaceDetector. This method
detects faces by finding pupils in the image, and returns a number of detected faces into
an array of FaceDetector.Faces class. For each instance of Face class, the distance between
two eyes of a face and the coordinate of the middle point between two eyes can be obtained.
Then we crop each detected face with a square area, which is the same as the blurring square
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described in Section 3.2.6. Also, the size of the cropped square is used to represent the size
of the corresponding face in the target filter module. To prepare for target filtering, we need
to detect the position of each face in the photo. To do so, we evenly divide the picture into
three regions (left, middle, right) along the horizontal direction. Then for each detected face,
we calculate the middle point between its eyes. If the middle point is located in the middle
region, we say this face is in the central region.
3.3.2 Facial Attribute Classifier
This module aims to predict a set of facial attributes from a given face image. As
described in Section 3.2.3, we use ABCNN to predict the facial attributes and ABCNN is
implemented by the Python interface of MxNet [14]. In particular, we build the ABCNN
network by replacing the final loss layer of a 16-layer VGG network from [15] by the loss
function in Eq. 3.7, and the architecture shown in Fig. 3. The architecture consists of
16 weight layers, including 13 convolution layers and 3 fully connected layers, which are
associated with over one million weights. Since the network only accepts RGB image input
with dimensions of 128*128 pixels, each cropped face obtained from the face detection and
preprocessing module should be scaled to that size before being sent into this classifier.
128*128*3 128*128*64
Convolution+ReLU
Max	pooling
Fully	conected+ReLU
ABCNN Output
64*64*128
56*56*256
28*28*512
14*14*512
7*7*512 1*1*4096 1*1*1000
Figure 3.3: Architecture of the ABCNN network.
In this chapter, the ABCNN network is trained on the CelebA dataset [16], which is
a large-scale facial attributes dataset. It contains 20 images for each of over 10K celebrities,
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hence with a total of more than 200K images. The first 160K images are used for training,
and the remaining 40K images are used for validation and testing, specifically, 20K for
validation and 20K for testing. For our implementation, we use a set of pre-cropped and
aligned face images provided by the CelebA dataset, and scale the dimensions of training
RGB images from 178*218 pixels to 128*128 pixels. Each image in the CelebA dataset is
annotated with binary labels of 40 facial attributes (e.g., ‘Young’ and ‘Male’). However,
in this work, we choose 16 out of the 40 attributes that do not change frequently for the
same person as our considered attributes. The 16 chosen facial attributes include {Arched
Eyebrows, Bushy Eyebrows, Big Lips, Big Nose, Point Nose, Black Hair, Blond Hair, Brown
Hair, Gray Hair, Eyeglasses, Bald, High Cheekbones, Narrow Eyes, Oval Face, Male, Young
}. In addition, since the ‘smiling’ attribute is required for target filtering, we also add it
into the classifier (note that it is not used for stranger determination but only for target
filtering).
3.4 Evaluations
To train the classifier, we set the batch size to 384 images per training iteration, and
hence the training process requires approximately 420 iterations to finish a full epoch on the
training set. The learning rate is initialized as 0.05, and reduced by a factor of 0.8 every
four epochs until it decays to 0.000001. We train the ABCNN for 110 epochs with all images
from training set on two NVidia K80 GPUs.
3.4.1 Model Selection
Classification accuracy is defined as the number of correctly predicted cases divided
by the number of testing images. From Eq. 3.2, we can derive the classification accuracy of
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each attribute i:
ei(X, Y ) =
1
Ntest
Ntest∑
j=1
acci(Xj, Yj) (3.9)
Consequently, we can evaluate the average classification accuracy by calculating the average
classification accuracy over all the N attributes:
E(X, Y ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ei(X, Y ) (3.10)
The ABCNN prediction model is trained on the training dataset, but the number
of training epochs needed is determined based on the validation dataset. Specifically, the
accuracy trend when the number of training epochs increases is shown in Fig. 3.4. As
the training continues, the accuracy over the training dataset keeps increasing. However,
training for more epochs means higher cost. Thus, based on the maximum accuracy over
the validation dataset, we stop training the ABCNN network after 80 epochs (with 89.84%
validation accuracy) and use the resulted model for performance evaluations in order to
guarantee the coverage of the model without too high cost.
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Figure 3.4: Average classification accuracy vs training epochs.
Then based on Eq. 3.9 we evaluate the classification accuracy of each facial attribute
on the test dataset, including 16 attributes used for stranger determination and the ‘Smiling’
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attribute for target filtering. The average accuracy over those 16 attributes is also tested
according to Eq. 3.10. As Fig. 3.5 shows, the average accuracy is 88.53% (see the horizontal
dashed line) which is pretty high. Out of the first 16 facial attributes, 6 attributes outperform
the average performance, including Bushy Eyebrows, Black Hair, Blond Hair, Gray Hair,
Eyeglasses, Bald and Male. For example, the classification accuracies of Eyeglasses and Bald
achieves 98.31% and 98.34%, respectively.
To measure the performance of our proposed ABCNN in predicting the facial at-
tributes, we compared it with the state-of-art algorithm proposed in [17]. They also con-
struct a multi-task training classifier and the corresponding facial attribute prediction and
average accuracy are represented with the blue dashed line and the horizontal blue solid
line in Fig. 5, respectively. In addition, we also compared the proposed ABCNN with [16]
which uses the basic CNN model to select features and inputs them to the SVM classifier
for training. Its performance is displayed by green line and green dashed line for facial at-
tributes prediction accuracy and average accuracy, respectively. ABCNN outperforms both
the multi-task training classifier in [17] and the CNN-SVM model [13].
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Figure 3.5: Classification accuracy of each attribute and average accuracy in testing.
51
3.4.2 Classification Consistency
Since the facial attributes are used for stranger determination, the trained classifier is
expected to make consistent predictions given a specific person. That is, given two different
face images of the same person, ideally all the 16 facial attributes obtained from the two
images are identical. To evaluate classification consistency, we use the LFW image database
[17] that has been widely used in the literature. Since images in the LFW database are
organized by person, it is more efficient to sample images for experiment. In this experiment,
we randomly pick 50 persons, and a pair of different face images of each person (see Fig. 3.6
as an example). The classification results over the two images in Fig. 3.6 are presented in
Table 3.1. It can be seen that the classified facial attributes of these two images are exactly
the same except ‘Big Lips’, ‘Brown Hair’ and ‘High Cheekbones’. Out of the 50 persons, the
classification results for 32 persons are fully consistent. For the rest 18 persons, 7 persons
have 15 identical attributes, 8 persons have 14 identical attributes, and the remaining 3
persons have 13 identical attributes.
(a) First face im-
age
(b) Second face
image
Figure 3.6: Two different face images from the same person [17].
Besides, we examine the classification consistency on persons with more than 4 face
images in the LFW dataset. In particular, we pick 2 pairs of different face images for each of
those 10 persons. Then we compare the predicted attributes pair by pair, and hence perform
20-pair comparisons. As Table 3.2 shows, 8 pairs of face images are labeled with the exactly
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Table 3.1: Facial Attributes Classification of Fig. 3.6(a) and Fig. 3.6(b).
Facial Attributes Fig. 3.6(a) Fig. 3.6(b)
Arched Eyebrows No No
Bushy Eyebrows No No
Big Lips No Yes
Big Nose Yes Yes
Pointy Nose No No
Black Hair No No
Brown Hair Yes No
Blond Hair No No
Gray Hair No No
Eyeglasses No No
Bald No No
High Cheekbones No Yes
Narrow Eyes No No
Oval Face No No
Male Yes Yes
Young No No
the same attributes, and only 6 pairs are labeled with 3 or more different attributes.
Table 3.2: Classification consistency of 10 persons with 2 pairs of face images each.
Number of Identical Attributes 16 15 14 13 12 11 10
Number of Pairs 8 4 2 2 2 1 1
Furthermore, we examine the possibility of two different persons being predicted with
identical attributes. We randomly pick 100 persons from the LFW dataset, and perform facial
attribute classification on a face image of each person. Then, we compare facial attributes of
every person with those of the other 99 persons and hence 4950 pairs are compared in total.
Only 144 pairs have exactly the same attributes. All these results show that the classification
consistency is high.
3.4.3 Optimal Thresholding
The above consistency experiments show that facial attributes of two face images from
the same person may not be perfectly identical. Hence, a scheme that depends on exactly
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matching of facial attributes between two faces will not work for stranger determination.
The stranger determination is implemented by thresholding the difference of facial attributes
between two compared face images to allow a reasonable difference between these two faces.
Hence, it is needed to find a proper threshold. The goal is that we can obtain more true
positives without causing too many false positives under the threshold. Here, true positive
means two different face images of the same person being determined as the same person.
False positive means images of two different persons being determined are from the same
person. In this experiment, we pick 50 persons from the LFW database, and two different
face images with each person. In order to evaluate false positive, 50 tests are conducted. In
each test, we pick one face image from the above 50 persons as the target, and choose another
face image from a different person to compare with the target. From the above classification
consistency evaluations, we consider 0, 1 and 2 as reasonable threshold candidates and show
the results in Table 3.3. Based on these results, we choose 1 as the threshold in stranger
determination which has good performance in both true positive and false positive.
Table 3.3: Effectiveness of stranger determination under different threshold with 50 tests.
Threshold=0 Threshold=1 Threshold=2
# True Positives 36 45 48
# False Positives 1 3 12
3.4.4 Effectiveness of Target Filter
This test aims to examine how well the target filter module can detect the target
from a photo. In this experiment, we perform target filter on field photos from two different
sources where multiple targets might be in one photo. We use false filtering rate to measure
the performance, which is defined as the percentage of times when not all targets in the photo
are successfully detected or any stranger appearing in the photo is mistakenly detected as
the target.
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(a) A test photo where
the target is success-
fully detected.
(b) A test photo where
the target filter failed.
Figure 3.7: Target filter test on photos taken by the authors (photo by author).
First, we evaluate the effectiveness of target filter on 100 photos, which we have
pictured by mobile phone in the past, and at least one target person is included in each
photo. The result shows that the false filtering rate is only 8%, which means the target filter
only fails to detect the target in 8 photos. Fig. 3.7 illustrates two example photos of our
test. Fig. 3.7(a) is a successful example, but Fig. 3.7(b) is a failed example. The reason for
unsuccessful target detection is that the face is not at the central region of the photo, and
Smiling attribute is falsely predicted as No. Based on our proposed three rules, only the rule
based on face size can be satisfied, and hence the target is not successfully detected.
Then we pick 100 photos shared by our friends in Facebook from 10/01/2016 to
12/26/2016. At least one target person is included in each photo. Fig. 3.8 shows some
example photos, where faces are blurred upon the friends request. Similar to the above test,
we run target filtering on these 100 photos. The false filtering rate is 12%, which means the
target filtering operation fails in 12 photos. We look into each of those 12 photos, and find
the same reason causing false target filtering. When multiple targets are shown in the photo,
the target at the rightmost or leftmost is detected as out of the central region of the photo.
Also, this target was not smiling when the photo was taken or the Smiling attribute is falsely
predicted as No. As a result, in those cases, the rules based on face position and smiling
cannot be satisfied, and hence the target filter cannot successfully detect all the targets in
the photo. However, the overall target filtering accuracy is still high.
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Figure 3.8: Target filter test on photos shared by friends on Facebook (used with
permission).
3.4.5 Accuracy of Protection
This part evaluates the effectiveness of our system in protecting the stranger’s privacy.
The experiments are conducted on our campus. Fig. 3.9 shows two example experiment
scenes.
Figure 3.9: Example Experiment Scenes (photo by author).
True Protection Rate: This group of tests considers the scenario where one target
person and two strangers appear in the photo. We assume either one of the two strangers or
both of them request face blurring. The true protection rate is defined as ratio of times when
the faces of the requesting strangers are blurred in the photo. For each requesting stranger,
we conduct 10 tests separately. Fig. 3.10 shows an example where the right stranger’s face
is successfully blurred. Table 3.4 shows the true protection rate which is high.
False Protection Rate: Again we consider the scenario where one target person and
two strangers appear in the photo. Suppose the two strangers in the photo do not request
56
Figure 3.10: Example of a successful protection (photo by author).
Table 3.4: True Protection Rate
# Requesting Strangers True Protection Rate
1 90%
2 80%
to blur their faces but other nearby strangers who are not in the photo submit blurring
requests. In this case, we define false protection rate as the percentage of times when any
of two strangers in the photo is mistakenly detected as a requesting stranger and hence
falsely blurred. To evaluate the false protection rate in a noisy environment, we conduct
simulations with 1, 3, 5 and 10 nearby requesting strangers separately. Specifically, in each
test, we randomly pick a certain number of entities from the LFW database, who act as
nearby requesting strangers, and one face image for each selected person. For each specific
number of requesting strangers, 50 tests are conducted separately. Table 3.5 shows results
with different number of requesting strangers. We can see that false protection rate increases
with the increasing number of nearby requesting strangers. This is because the more nearby
requesting strangers, the higher possibility of their facial attributes being overlapped with
that of strangers in the photo. Note that the false protection rate is as low as 3% with only
one nearby requesting stranger. Even under noisy environment with 3 nearby strangers who
request face blurring, the false protection is only 8%. The false protection rate increases
to 24% with 10 nearby requesting strangers, but this case does not occur often in the real
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world.
Table 3.5: False Protection Rate
# Nearby Requesting Strangers
1 3 5 10
False Protection Rate 3% 8% 14% 24%
3.5 Related Work
See Chapter 2.5 for references of photo and video privacy.
Facial Attributes Classification Kumar et al. [28] propose an approach to train
facial attribute classifiers. Features from manually-picked facial regions for each facial at-
tribute are separately optimized using AdaBoost algorithms. In addition, independent SVM
classifiers are trained by feeding optimized features. In this approach, various features are
learnt for each facial attribute, and an independent SVM classifier is separately trained.
Even though it is a valid approach, it is not efficient for feature extraction and classification.
Recently, with the increasing popularity of convolution neural network (CNN), it has been
leveraged to extract more sophisticated features of facial attributes. For instance, Kang et al.
[29] propose gated CNNs, which aim to determine which regions of a face are most correlated
to corresponding attributes. Then, the output of such CNNs is encoded into a global feature
vector for training independent binary SVM classifiers. Zhang et al. [30] apply CNNs to
learn facial attributes, which are used to infer social relations between pairs of identities with
an image. Liu et al. [16] design three CNNs, including two localization networks (LNets)
and an attribute recognition network (ANet). LNet is designed for localizing features in face
images, while ANet is trained on face identities and attributes to extract features. Then,
independent SVM classifiers are trained on those extracted features. However, none of them
can be directly used for imbalanced distributed datasets.
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3.6 Summary
We proposed a system PoliteCamera to protect strangers’ privacy who are accidentally
captured in a photo taken by mobile phones. The system can inform nearby strangers that
they are possibly included in a photo and give them an option to blur their faces in the
photo. A novel ABCNN structure is designed to predict facial attributes, where the facial
attributes are used to determine whether a requesting stranger is in the photo and which
face in the photo belongs to him. We implemented a prototype system, and evaluated its
performance through experiments. The accuracy of the facial attributes prediction is better
than the state of the art, and experimental evaluations demonstrate that the system can
effectively protect strangers privacy.
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4 Feature-Based Model for Differentiating the Target From Strangers in
Photos
4.1 Introduction
Nowadays, powerful cameras are embedded in mobile phones. It changes the way
people to record their daily life, an increasing number of people tend to take photos using
mobile phones anywhere and anytime. However, as introduced in Chapter 2 and Chapter
3, the convenience brought by mobile cameras cause privacy issues. When a user takes a
photo of a beautiful view or a friend using his mobile phone, frequently a stranger is also
accidentally included in the photo, with the face clearly recognizable. In such cases, the
photo can reveal the stranger’s location and even activity, and hence breaches his privacy.
Even though we propose two systems PrivacyCamera and PoliteCamera in Chapter
2 an Chapter 3 to protect strangers’ privacy in photos, these solutions depend on the co-
operation between the photographer and the stranger. Specifically, both the photographer
and the stranger need to install those systems on their mobile phones, and the stranger who
does not want to appear in the photo needs to send either GPS location information or facial
attributes to the photographer for determining whether he is in the photo or not. Although
those solutions can provide effective privacy protections, there still exist some limitations.
First, we cannot guarantee every user will install those systems. Therefore, even if the pho-
tographer is willing to protect the strangers’ privacy, the protection cannot be successful if
some of the strangers do not install those systems. Second, the communication between the
photographer and the stranger may not be reliable. If the communication channel is dis-
connected, the blurring request and associated information such as GPS location and facial
attributes cannot return to the photographer, and hence the system cannot perform stranger
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determination and provide effective privacy protection.
Can we protect strangers’ privacy in photos while addressing the aforementioned
limitations? We can perfectly address those issues if we can get rid of the cooperation
between the photographer and the stranger. Specifically, if all the strangers’ faces can be
automatically detected and blurred in a photo, the cooperation is not necessary. However,
there is a challenge in this case. Since the target might be a person that is intentionally
captured in the photo and should not be blurred, how to automatically distinguish the target
from the stranger in a photo is a very challenging task.
Even though we proposed a heuristic rule based approach to distinguish the target
from the stranger in a photo in Chapter 3.2.5, the performance is not very good through
experiments. In that approach, we proposed three properties as rules based on our observa-
tions from real-world experience: smiling, face size and face position. Then, we make the
distinguishment based on such rules. Although the proposed approach works for a majority
of cases, there are some exceptions in special cases.
In this chapter, we explore more features to improve distinguishment accuracy. In
addition, we build a binary classifier based on these features using supervise machine learning
method.
The contribution of this chapter is summarized as follows:
• We propose a set of features, based on which we build a binary classifier to distinguish
the target from the stranger in a photo.
• We implement the classifier based on proposed features using several supervised learn-
ing algorithms, and explore their performance.
• We explore deeper in how feature selections affect classification accuracy, and find out
the features that are important to the model.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the machine
learning algorithms that are applied in this chapter. Section 4.3 proposes a set of features to
improve the distinguishment between the target and the stranger. Section 4.4 describes the
dataset collection. Section 4.5 shows evaluation results. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Background
This section introduces the supervised learning algorithms that are applied in this
chapter.
Decision Tree. Decision tree [1] is a non-parametric supervised learning algorithm
that can be used for classification. The decision tree model aims to predict the value of a
target variable by learning simple decision rules that are inferred from training data. To
construct a decision tree, the most significant attribute will be set as the root. Then, the
dataset can be split based on the values of attribute, and repeat this process until leaves. The
significance of an attribute is measured by information gain [2]. The larger the information
gain, the more significant the attribute. Once the decision tree is built, it is easy to interpret
and can be visualized.
Random Forest. Random forest [3] is an ensemble learning algorithm based on
decision trees. The prediction is computed as the averaged prediction of each individual
decision tree. Compared with the decision tree, we build each tree in the ensemble using a
sample drawn with replacement from training data. Besides, for constructing the tree, we
choose the attribute that is the best split among a random subset of the features instead
of the best split among all features. Even though the bias of the forest slight increases due
to the randomness, the variance usually decreases more than compensating for the increase
in bias. The random forest has a significantly low risk of overfitting and hence make good
generalization.
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Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT). GBDT [4, 5] is another typical
ensemble method based on decision trees. Compared with random forest, GBDT is composed
of shallow decision trees instead of fully grown decision trees. In addition, in order to train
the GBDT model, we assign different weights for samples in training data. The weights will
be dynamically adjusted based on the classification accuracy on each sample. The sample
with worst performance will be assigned largest weight, so that it can attract the model’s
more attention. Furthermore, the prediction is made by the weighted average prediction of
each individual decision tree.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). SVM [6] is a supervised machine learning al-
gorithm that can be employed for classification, regression and outliers detection. SVMs
are more commonly used in classification problems, which is also our focus in this chapter.
SVMs are implemented by finding a hyperplane that can best divides variables into two
classes. Support vectors are referred to critical data points nearest to the hyperplane. If we
remove them the position of the dividing hyperplane will be altered. It is very effective in
high-dimensional spaces. In addition, it is flexible to specify the decision function by using
different kernel functions.
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP). A MLP is class of feedforward artificial neural
network [7, 8]. There can be one more hidden layers between the input and output layer.
Except for the input nodes, each node in the hidden layer adopts a non-linear activation
function. It can learn a non-linear function estimator for both classification and regression
problems, which is the critical difference from a linear perceptron.
4.3 Feature Selection
In Chapter 3, we proposed a heuristic rule based approach to distinguish the target
from the stranger in a photo. Three features smiling, face size and face position are
66
considered in that approach. In this chapter, in addition to those features, we take more
features into account to improve the classification accuracy based on our observation from
hundreds of online photos in different settings.
Blurriness Since the target is intensionally captured by the photographer, he is
usually located in focus area of a photo. Compared with focus area, the area out of focus
is usually more blurry. How can we measure the blurriness of a given area in a photo? One
straightforward approach [9] is to compute the Fast Fourier Transform of that area and check
the distribution of low and high frequencies. If there is a low amount of high frequencies,
that area can be considered as blurry. However, it is very challenging to define what is
an optimal threshold. In this chapter, we adopt the variation of Laplacian [10] to measure
the blurriness as shown in Equation 4.1. The reason why we choose this method is due to
the definition of Laplacian itself, which is computed to measure the second derivative of an
image. The high variance indicates that there are rapid intensity changes, which can be
used to infer that the image is in focus. Generally, given an area in a photo, the higher
the Laplacian variance, the more possible that area is in focus. As shown in Figure 4.1, the
target’s face is much clearer than the strangers’ faces in this photo, which is consistent with
that the blurriness of the target’s face is much larger than that of the strangers’ faces.
V ar(Lap(x, y)) = V ar(
∂2I
∂x2
+
∂2I
∂y2
), where I(x, y) is the pixel intensity values. (4.1)
Pitch As Figure 4.2 shows, the pitch can be defined as the head rotation angle
around the x axis. The pitch is measured in range of -30°to 30°, which is a reasonable range
that can cover most cases. Beyond that range, the face is not guaranteed to be detected. As
a result, if one’s face can be detected, we treat the pitch of it as 30°or -30°even if the pitch
is over that.
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Figure 4.1: The example of blurriness measurement in a photo [11]
Yaw As shown in Figure 4.3, the yaw is an estimate of head rotation angle around
the y axis, ranging from -30°to 30°. Beyond that range, the face is hard to be detected by
the system.
y
Figure 4.3: Orientation of the face in terms of yaw.
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xFigure 4.2: Orientation of the face in terms of pitch.
Roll Figure 4.3 shows the orientation of the face in terms of roll. It ranges from
-180°to 180°.
z
Figure 4.4: Orientation of the face in terms of roll.
Moreover, the smiling feature is defined as a binary variable in Chapter 3, but we
change it to a numerical variable in this chapter. Finally, we can build a binary classifier
based on these seven features, and the range of each feature is listed in Table 4.1.
69
Table 4.1: The Range of Each Feature
Feature Range
Smiling [0,100]
Face Size (0,1]
Face Position (0,1)
Blurriness [0,+∞)
Pitch [-30,+30]
Yaw [-30,+30]
Roll [-180,+180]
4.4 Dataset
Since there is no public available dataset for distinguishing the target from the
stranger in photos, we collect our own dataset and manually label the data. The dataset
consists of 214 photos with 389 detected faces in total. Out of 389 detected faces, 203 faces
are labeled as stranger, and the other 186 faces are labeled as target.
To manually label the data, the captions of collected photos can give us some hints
in most cases. For example, if a caption refers that the photo is related to a celebrity, it is
obvious that the celebrity in the photo is the target. In other cases, we label the target and
the stranger in a photo based on our photographing experience.
To collect the dataset, we mainly focus on the photos including celebrities that are
taken in public scenarios, such as airports and attractions. The reason that we consider such
scenarios is that the celebrity in the photo is usually the target and easy to identify, and
some strangers are often captured in the photo. The most important principle for collecting
the dataset is to cover as many settings as possible. For example, as shown in Figure 4.5
the dataset contains the photos that include only the target, only the stranger and both of
them.
In addition, from the perspective of features, we aim to cover both regular cases and
special cases. For instance, in terms of the face position, the target is usually close to the
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(a) only the target is included (photo by author)
(b) only the strangers are included [11]
(c) both targets and the stranger are included
[11]
Figure 4.5: Example photos of different settings in terms of inclusion of the target and the
stranger.
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center of the view. However, there exist special cases where the target is located aside in a
photo. Figure 4.6 shows aforementioned two cases in terms of the target’s face position in a
photo. The similar data-collecting principle is also applied to other considered features.
(a) the target is at the center (b) the target stands aside
Figure 4.6: Example photos of different settings in terms of the target’s face position [11].
4.5 Evaluations
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed feature-based model. We
train the model based different supervised learning algorithms using Scikit-learn [12]. We
also compare the performance of each model and explore how feature selections affect the
classification accuracy.
4.5.1 Classification Accuracy
In Table 4.2, we compare the classification accuracy of each model. The GBDT
model beats the other models with 93.27% accuracy, and thus we adopt this model as our
final classifier for the rest of experiments. However, the classification of each model is over
91%, which demonstrates our proposed features are effective for distinguishing the target
from the stranger in photos. It also means that the feature-based model is not sensitive to
different learning algorithms.
72
Table 4.2: The Comparison of Classification Accuracy
Model Classification Accuracy
Decision Tree 91.02%
Random Forest 92.31%
GBDT 93.27%
SVM 91.76%
MLP 91.35%
4.5.2 Exploration of Feature Selection
After comparing the classification accuracy, we want to explore how different feature
selections affect the performance. Even though the decision tree model is not the best
one in terms of performance, its structure can show the significance of each feature. After
looking into the tree structure, the ‘face size’ is the most important feature and the ‘face
position’ is another important feature. However, it shows that yaw is the least significant
feature. To explore further in feature selection, we compare the classification accuracy of
the GBDT model based on different feature set by removing the significant features and the
least important feature and keeping the reminded features same. As shown in Table 4.3,
the classification accuracy dramatically decreases to 73.07% when we remove both ‘face size’
and ‘face position’ features. If we remove the ‘face size’ or ‘face position’ feature alone, the
accuracy drops to 82.05% and 84.61% separately. However, the accuracy keeps stable when
‘yaw’ is moved out, which indicates ‘yaw’ is not a useful feature for our task, and hence we
can remove it when training the model.
Table 4.3: The Evaluation of Classification Accuracy Based on Different Feature Sets
Feature Set Classification Accuracy
Full Feature Set 93.27%
Without ‘Face Size’ 82.05%
Without ‘Face Position’ 84.61%
Without ‘Face Size’ and ‘Face Position’ 73.07%
Without ‘Yaw’ 93.27%
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4.5.3 Performance Comparison with Heuristic Rule Based Target Filter
Next, we compare the performance of our proposed feature-based model with the
heuristic rule based target filter that is presented in Section 3.4.4. To make performance
evaluation, we use 42 photos from our dataset with 80 detected faces. We use true detection
rate to measure the performance, which is defined as the percentage of times when the faces
are correctly detected as the target or the stranger in photos. As shown in Table 4.4, the true
detection rate of the feature-based model is 92.5%, but the heuristic rule based model only
achieves 81.25% true detection rate. Therefore, the feature-based model is more effective to
detect the target from a photo than the heuristic rule based model.
Table 4.4: The Comparison of False Filtering Rate
Feature Based Model Heuristic Rule Based Model
True detection rate 92.5% 81.25%
4.6 Summary
We proposed a feature-based model to distinguish the target from the stranger in a
photo. Based on this model, we can protecting strangers’ privacy in a photo by automatically
detecting them and blurring their faces in the photo, and hence there is no need for the
cooperation between the photographer and the stranger compared with the solutions in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. We implemented the model based on different supervised learning
algorithms and compared their performance. Evaluations show that the feature-based model
can effectively tell the target from the stranger in a photo. In addition, the performance of
the feature-based model is better than that of the heuristic rule based approach. Moreover,
we explored how feature selections affect the performance.
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5 PhotoSafer: Content-based and Context-aware Private Photo Protection
for Smartphones
5.1 Introduction
Smartphones have shifted the way people take, store and share photos. There is
an increasing number of people who are able to take photos with smartphones anytime,
anywhere. Also, almost all social networks allow users to share photos from corresponding
smartphone apps (e.g., Instagram). Consequently, more and more people prefer to store
photos on their smartphones for convenience, even though some photos are private and
sensitive (e.g., drivers license). It is reported that the average person has 630 photos stored
on their phones [1]. However, many installed apps on smartphones have access to stored
photos and the network, which may cause leakage of private photos to remote parties. This
raises a privacy concern that users private photos might be accessed by apps without their
awareness.
The Android platform offers users two approaches for controlling permissions. At
the early stage of Android, users are asked to grant permissions when they install an app.
Specifically, an app will disclose the full list of resources that it wants to access at installation.
Either all requested permissions are granted, or the entire installation is aborted. Prior
research has shown that most users do not care about or understand these disclosures at
installation [2]. With the evolution of the Android platform, a new permission scheme has
replaced the install-time disclosures for enhancing smoothness of installation process. In
particular, users need to grant permissions only when an app requests a sensitive resource
for the first use. The users’ decisions to these permission requests will be applied to all
future requests by that app for the same permission. However, this scheme only considers
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the user’s preference for permission requests when an app is used for the first time. An app
once granted access to a photo at the first access will be able to access all photos for all the
time. It does not account for the fact that the user’s preference for subsequent permission
requests might change under different contextual circumstances. For instance, a user is
willing to upload a photo that was taken in a private gathering through a social-network
app. However, the same user might feel uncomfortable for the same app running in the
background to access such private photos without his awareness.
To protect private photos, some apps have been developed [3, 4, 5], which apply
authentication techniques (e.g., password and fingerprint) to control access to those photos.
However, they either significantly affect the usability and user experience or cannot really
secure private photos. Specifically, users are usually required to manually identify and import
private photos from the native photo gallery app on Android to such third-party apps. It
is very challenging and boring for users to manually select private photos from hundreds
or even thousands photos on their mobile phones. Moreover, some of these apps only copy
private photos to a specific protected folder but still keep them in the native photo gallery
app, which requires users to remove those private photos from the native photo gallery app.
If a user forgets to do so, no protection can be provided. Even worse, some apps merely move
user-specified private photos to a hidden folder, which can be easily detected and accessed
without any challenge by using existing file management apps [6, 7, 8]. In addition, when a
user wants to share private photos with other people through social network apps such as
Instagram, since these social network apps usually only allow users to choose to-be-shared
photos from the native gallery app or the file management system, it is inconvenient for users
if private photos are kept in separate app-specified folders. Hence, existing solutions cannot
really secure private photos while offering friendly user experience.
Some work has been done for refining Android permission systems. Nauman et al.
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[9] and Jeon et al. [10] designed fine-grained permissions for Android, but do not specifically
protect stored private photos. CHIPS [11] is a face-recognition-based access control system
for stored photos on Android phones, but can only protect photos that contain pre-specified
faces, which cannot be applied to other types of private photos (e.g., credit card).
To this end, we design a novel content-based, context-aware private photo protection
system named PhotoSafer [12] for smartphones, which provides real-time access control
over private photos based on the photo contents and the contextual status of accesses, and
discloses the specific sensitive content that a private photo contains to users before that
photo can be accessed. Our contributions are as follows:
• We analyze the top 200 free apps on the Apkpure, which is a very popular third-party
Android app store, for evaluating the potential privacy risks that current apps pose to
private photos.
• We conduct an online survey with 112 respondents to investigate mobile phone users’
privacy concerns about private photos, including common types of private photos,
awareness of photo-accessing operations by apps, etc.
• We design a novel content-based, context-aware private photo protection system Pho-
toSafer, which can automatically identify private photos and perform real-time access
control over private photos based on the context status of mobile phone and whether
the requesting apps are running in the foreground.
• We implement a prototype system on Nexus 5 phones, and evaluate the system’s
performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents how this work
is motivated, including a permissions analysis of 200 popular apps and an online survey.
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Section 5.3 introduces the design and workflow of PhotoSafer. Section 5.4 describes the
prototype implementation. Section 5.5 shows evaluation results. Section 5.7 reviews related
work. Section 5.6 discusses the limitations of this work. Section 5.8 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Motivation
To better understand the privacy issues with photos stored on mobile phones, we
firstly analyze the requested permissions of 200 apps to demonstrate the potential risk of
unauthorized access to private photos, and then investigate users’ concerns about private
photos in the real world through an online survey.
5.2.1 Permission Analysis
Let us first analyze what permissions are required to access stored photos on the
Android platform. For an Android device, photos are stored in the external storage di-
rectory that can be either a physical removable memory card or a logical partition in the
device’s memory. Hence, to access stored photos, an app has to be granted the permission
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE, which is the only required permission. However, the external stor-
age directory is not the repository only for photos, but also for other files such as songs. As
a result, the correlation between the permission READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and photo access
control is not intuitive to average users. In addition, due to the aforementioned limitations
of the Android permission system, users are allowed to choose whether an app can access to
all stored photos, but cannot realize selective control over any individual photo.
Next, we analyze apps’ requested permissions to examine the potential risk of unau-
thorized access to stored photos. Due to the download restrictions of Google Play, we
analyze the top 200 free apps (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, etc.) from Apkpure [13], which
is a popular third-party Android app store. We particularly identify apps that request
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both READ EXTERNAL STORAGE and INTERNET permissions, since the combination of these
two permissions allow potential leakage of private photos to another party. The analysis
tool Androguard [14] is used to extract the requested permissions of each analyzed app. It
is found that 164 out of the 200 apps request both READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and INTERNET
permissions. That means 82% of the top 200 free apps on the Apkpure have complete access
to stored photos on a user’s mobile phone, and could even leak these photos through the
Internet. Thus, there is a necessity for finer-grained access control on private photos.
5.2.2 Online Survey
PhotoSafer’s design is also motivated by an online survey which is designed to investi-
gate mobile phone users’ concerns about unauthorized access to private photos. The survey
was conducted with user consent under an IRB approval from the University of Arkansas.
The survey is available online [15], and the results here show statistics of all the 112 re-
sponses collected on December 22, 2017. The mobile phone platform usage of respondents
is described in Table 5.1, and the age distribution of survey respondents is shown in Table
5.2.
Table 5.1: Mobile Phone Platform Usage of Survey Respondents
Mobile Phone Platform Proportion of Respondents
Android 77.7%
iPhone 21.4%
Windows Phone 0.9%
Table 5.2: Age Group Distribution of Survey Respondents
Age Group Proportion of Respondents
Less than 20 years 5.4%
20-30 years 84.8%
30-40 years 9.8%
Participants were asked whether they store private photos (driver license, passport,
etc.) on their mobile phones. An overwhelming majority (88.6%) deemed that some private
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photos are stored on their mobile phones. To explore which specific type of photos are
considered as private by respondents, this survey provides different options for participants.
As shown in Table 5.3, almost every participant considered photos that contain Photo ID,
Legal Documents and Family as private, and over a half (57.9%) agreed that nude photos
are also sensitive. In a consequence, the above four types of photo contents are used as
references to identify different categories of private photos for this work. Even though those
types do not cover all cases, they can represent a significant portion of private photos in the
real world.
Table 5.3: Photo Types and the Proportion of Respondents That Consider Them as Private
Photo Type Proportion of Respondents
Photo ID (e.g., driver license, passport) 97.4%
Legal Documents (e.g. SSN) 97.4%
Family (e.g., family party) 76.5%
Nudes 57.9%
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.4, 67.5% of participants agreed that there are more
than 10 installed apps on their mobile phones that are granted access to photos. Also,
for each of the participants, there is at least one installed app that has access to the photos
stored on her/his mobile phone. However, the results show that most of participants (87.5%)
do not clearly know whether any installed app can access photos in the background or not
without their awareness. As a result, it is an urgent necessity to design a system to protect
private photos from being accessed without users’ awareness.
Table 5.4: Number of Installed Apps That Can Access Photos
Number of Installed Apps Proportion of Respondents
10+ 67.5%
6-10 21.9%
1-5 10.4%
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5.3 System Design
This section describes the design of PhotoSafer.
5.3.1 System Overview
Our goal for designing PhotoSafer is to protect private photos from unauthorized
access by mobile apps, without changing the way apps access photos and how users store
photos on their mobile phones. In addition, the system should not affect the usability of
apps and user experience; i.e., the access control enforcement decision must be made within
a reasonable amount of time.
Our basic idea is that when an app requests to access a particular photo, users should
be aware about it and decide whether the app can access that photo. The naive approach
is to prompt users to check the photo and make a decision every time. However, this will
definitely degrade the usability of the system and apps. To address this problem, PhotoSafer
is designed to be able to automatically check whether the content of photo is private, and
determine whether the user is aware of the app’s access request based on the contextual
status of the phone and the app. Specifically, when the phone is locked, the user is not
operating the phone for photo access and thus most likely does not know that an app is
accessing the photo. Even when the phone is unlocked, the app which requests access to the
photo might be running in the background. In this case, the user probably also does not
know that the app is accessing the photo. Generally, a user is aware of the photo access if
the app is running in the foreground, since usually the access request is triggered by the user
in this scenario. In this case, the system can automatically check the photo content through
a trained classifier and inform the user whether the photo contains private information and
what private information it is. The system also allows the user to determine whether the
access request should be permitted. To minimize the time needed to identify private photo
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content during user operation, PhotoSafer caches the contents of photos in a database in
advance. In this way, PhotoSafer can achieve real-time response to photo access, such that
the rquesting app’s usability and user experience will not be affected. To make the system
work, PhotoSafer needs to be integrated into the Android kernel as a system service, since
it needs privileges to interpose photo access. When PhotoSafer is initialized, it will feed all
stored photos into a trained classifier to identify photo contents (e.g., photo ID), and then
the result will be stored in a database. Whenever a new photo is added, it will be fed into
the classifier and the classification result will be updated into the database.
The workflow of PhotoSafer is shown in Figure 5.1. When an app requests to access
a specific photo, the photo access will be interposed and system status will be checked.
If the phone is locked, then the access request will be automatically denied. However, if
the phone is unlocked, the system will continue checking the app’s status. If the app that
requests photo access is running in the background, then the access request will also be
automatically denied. On the contrary, if the app is running in the foreground, the photo
content can be immediately obtained by querying the database, where the content type of
each photo is stored. Finally, if the photo is classified as public, the access permission will
be automatically granted. Otherwise, an alert will be prompted by informing the user of
what private information is contained in the photo and requesting the user to determine
permission. If the user trusts the app and grants permission to it, then the photo access will
be continued; otherwise it will be denied.
5.3.2 Architecture
As Figure 5.2 shows, the system consists of four major modules: photo access inter-
position, status checker, photo content classifier and photo content database. We can divide
the overall workflow of PhotoSafer into three steps. First, when the system is initialized
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Figure 5.1: The workflow of PhotoSafer
on a phone, the pre-trained photo content classifier performs classifications on all stored
photos, and the results will be stored in the photo content database. In the database, each
record consists of a tuple (photo id, content type), where photo id is the unique identifier
in each photo’s universal resource identifier (e.g., content://com.android.providers.media.
documents/document/image%photo id) in Android and content type represents whether a
specific photo is not private or contains which specific type of private content, such as
(’10001’, ’public’) and (’10002’, ’photo ID’). Then, when an app requests to access a specific
photo, the photo access interposition module will interrupt the app’s operation and trigger
the status checker module to check the system status and the app’s current running status.
If the phone is either locked or the app is running in background, the access request will be
directly denied. Otherwise, a query with the photo’s photo id will be sent to the photo con-
tent database. Finally, if the returned result from photo content database shows the photo
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is public, the access request will be automatically permitted, and photo access interposition
will resume the app’s operation. However, if the photo contains some private information,
an alert will be prompted by describing what private information is contained in the photo
and requesting the user to make the decision of whether the photo access interposition will
resume the app’s operation.
Status 
Checker
Photo Access 
Interposition
Photo 
Content
Database 
Photo Content  
Classiﬁer
Photo Access
 Decision
Figure 5.2: The architecture of PhotoSafer
The design of PhotoSafer is based on several technologies available in off-the-shelf
mobile phones. Photo access interposition can be done by modifying the Android ker-
nel. The status checker can be implemented by Android APIs KeyguardManager and
ActivityManager. The photo content database can be implemented by using SQLite. Next,
we will describe how to identify private photos.
5.3.3 Photo Content Classifier
Given an input photo in pre-defined dimensions, this module aims to detect whether
that photo contains some specific private information. This is done by training a deep
convolutional neural network (DCNN) to detect the private content of photos.
Formally, let P be the set of input photos. For a given photo x ∈ P, let y ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} encode the categorical labels {‘public’, ‘photo id’, ‘legal document’, ‘family’,
‘nude’} of the photo. Let H be the hypothesis space of possible decision functions, and
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f(θTx) be the decision function, where θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θN} is the network weights. Hence,
the loss function can be defined as L(f(θTx), y). Let E(L) be the expected loss over the
range of inputs P. In this work, we use cross-entropy to estimate the loss, and hence the
optimization task is to minimize the expected cross-entropy loss.
f = arg min
f∈H
E(L) (5.1)
For each input x, the corresponding classification result is f(x), and hence the ac-
cording accuracy acc(x) can be defined as:
acc(x, y) =

+1 y = f(x)
0 otherwise
(5.2)
However, the main challenge for training a DCNN to identify private photos is acquir-
ing a sufficient number of private photos to train on. Generally, a DCNN requires a relatively
large set of training data to perform well. To address this challenge, we adopt the transfer
learning [16] approach to train our DCNN model. Specifically, we pretrain a DCNN model
on a large dataset ImageNet [17], which contains 1.2 million images with 1000 categories.
Then, we tune the parameters of the output layer in the pretrained model on the small
number of private photos while keeping the parameters of all the other layers unchanged.
5.4 Implementation
Due to the time limitation, we implemented PhotoSafer as a standalone app on An-
droid phones instead of integrating it into the Android kernel. However, the current imple-
mentation will not affect the evaluation for our proposed scheme, and we plan to implement
its integration with Android kernel in future work. Generally, the app works like the native
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photo gallery app that comes with the Android system. The prototype app was specifi-
cally designed so that it will access some private photos under different system status and
app-running status. The photo content classifier was implemented using Python 2.7 and
Tensorflow [18], which is an open-source deep learning framework. The other modules were
implemented by available technologies, as mentioned in Section 5.3.2.
5.4.1 Photo Content Classifier
This module aims to identify whether a given photo is public or contains some spe-
cific private information. As described in Section 5.3.3, we use transfer learning to train a
DCNN model. In particular, we build the classifier using the Python APIs of Tensorflow
and adopting MobileNets [19]. The MobileNets are a class of DCNNs that are specifically
designed for efficiently running on mobile devices. The significant difference between the
MobileNets architecture and a traditional DCNNs is that instead of a single 3x3 convolution
layer followed by batch norm and rectified linear unit (ReLU), MobileNets split the convo-
lution into a 3×3 depthwise convolution layer and a 1×1 pointwise convolution layer. It
has been demonstrated that the computing operations and model size will be significantly
reduced in this way. MobileNets are usually not as accurate as traditional DCNNs, but
it provides a trade-off between accuracy and resource usage. Specifically, MobileNets offer
two parameters to tune the resource and accuracy trade-off: width multiplier and resolution
multiplier. The value of width multiplier should be set between 0 and 1, while the resolution
multiplier might be various. The width multiplier allows us to adjust the thickness of the
DCNN, and the resolution multiplier changes the input dimensions of images, which can
reduce the internal representation complexity at every layer. Table 5.5 shows that given a
fixed resolution multiplier, with the increase of width multiplier the number of computing
operations and parameters will dramatically increase. However, when the width multiplier
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is fixed, the larger the input dimension, the more the required computing operations.
Table 5.5: MobileNets with Different Width Multipliers
Width Multiplier ImageNet Accuracy Million Operations of Mult-Add Million Parameters
MobileNet 1.0 224 70.6% 569 4.2
MobileNet 0.75 224 68.4% 325 2.6
MobileNet 0.5 224 63.7% 149 1.3
MobileNet 0.25 224 50.6% 41 0.5
Table 5.6: MobileNets with Different Resolution Multipliers
Resolution Multiplier ImageNet Accuracy Million Operations of Mult-Add Million Parameters
MobileNet 1.0 224 70.6% 569 4.2
MobileNet 1.0 192 69.1% 418 4.2
MobileNet 1.0 160 67.2% 290 4.2
MobileNet 1.0 224 64.4% 186 4.2
In this work, we fix the input dimension as 224×224, but change the width multiplier
for comparisons in Section 5.5.2. Firstly, we train the MobileNets on ImageNet with fine-
tuning parameters. After that, we fine-tune the output layer of pretrained model with our
collected dataset of private photos, but keep parameters of the other layers unchanged. The
details of the dataset are described in Section 5.5.1.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we systematically evaluate the performance of PhotoSafer through a
number of experiments. To better illustrate the benefits provided by our proposed system,
we also make clear comparisons against existing approaches. Particularly, we conduct the
following experiments. Firstly, we conduct extensive experiments to measure the private
photo identification accuracy. Secondly, we test the time taken by the system to obtain photo
content classification results from the database. The evaluations for classification accuracy
are made on Ubuntu 17.04 64-bit machine with 32G RAM and one NVIDIA TITAN Xp
GPU. The other experiments are conducted on Nexus 5 phones.
89
5.5.1 Dataset
Since private photos that are shared on a public domain are limited, it is a challenging
task to collect private photos for training deep learning models. Furthermore, there is no
standard definition of ‘private photo’ applicable for every user, since it is a very subjective
determination. Thus it is hard to collect one private photo dataset to cover all cases. How-
ever, Zerr et al. [20] published a dataset collected from Flickr, which is the only publicly
available dataset for photo privacy research at this time. This dataset consists of 37,535
photos, which are labeled as Private, Public and Undecided. Since the private photos in this
dataset do not include most of the private types reported from our survey, we only use the
Public photos from this dataset as public photos in our dataset. Additionally, we collect
3,097 private photos in four common types as shown in Table 5.3 from Google Image, with
some example photos shown in Figure 5.3. 80% of the dataset is used for training, and the
remained 20% is used for testing. The distribution of each type of photo is illustrated in
Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Dataset Distribution
Photo Type Number of Photos
Photo ID (e.g., driver license, passport) 1353
Legal Documents (e.g. SSN) 469
Family (e.g., family party) 682
Nudes 543
Public 14664
5.5.2 Classification Accuracy
As described above, we trained MobileNets models with a fixed input dimension of
224× 224 but with different width multipliers. To be specific, we set the width multiplier as
1.0, 0.75 , 0.5 and 0.25 separately. To compare the classification accuracy, we also compare
our MobileNets model with an Inception v3 model [22] that is trained on the same dataset.
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(a) Driver License (photo by au-
thor)
(b) Photo ID [21]
(c) Legal Document [21] (d) Family [21] (e) Nude [21]
(f) Public [21]
Figure 5.3: Example photos in our dataset. Sensitive information are removed from the
photos.
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In addition, all the models are trained in two ways. Firstly, we directly train each model
with our dataset. Secondly, we adopt transfer learning to train each model; i.e., we firstly
train each model with ImageNet and then fine-tune the model with our dataset.
As shown in Table 5.8, the classification accuracy of each model that is trained in
transfer learning is higher than that of each directly trained model. In particular, we observe
that the accuracy improves between 12% and 17%. It also shows the Inception v3 model has a
slightly higher accuracy than the MobileNet 1.0 224 model, but the model size is much bigger
than the MobileNet 1.0 224 model. This means it requires much more computation resources
for only a little performance improvement, which is not a good fit for resource-constrained
mobile phones. In addition, with respect to MobileNets models, with the decreasing width
multiplier the classification accuracy becomes lower and the model size is smaller. Based
on above comparisons, we choose the MobileNet 1.0 224 model with transfer learning as our
final classifier due to its high classification accuracy and reasonable model size.
Table 5.8: Comparison of Classification Accuracy and Model Size
Model Accuracy Model Size
Inception v3 80.3% 87.4 MB
MobileNet 1.0 224 77.5% 17.1 MB
MobileNet 0.75 224 72.6% 10.5 MB
MobileNet 0.5 224 68.7% 5.5 MB
MobileNet 0.25 224 63.3% 2 MB
Inception v3+Transfer Learning 97.3% 87.4 MB
MobileNet 1.0 224+Transfer Learning 94.3% 17.1 MB
MobileNet 0.75 224+Transfer Learning 93.5% 10.5 MB
MobileNet 0.5 224+Transfer Learning 91.2% 5.5 MB
MobileNet 0.25 224+Transfer Learning 89.7% 2 MB
As shown in Table 5.9, we also evaluate the classification accuracy for each type of
private photo. It can be seen that our deep learning model achieves higher classification
accuracy for each type of private photo than that of the baseline model. For instance, the
classification accuracy of ‘Photo ID’ and ‘Legal Document’ are as high as 97.8%.
92
Table 5.9: Classification Accuracy for Each Type of Photo
Model Photo ID Legal Document Family Nude Public
MobileNet 1.0 224 97.8% 97.8% 95.6% 86.2% 94.3%
In Table 5.10 we further explore the misclassifications. Even though there are a small
number of misclassifications on each type of private photo, none of these are mistakenly
classified as ‘Public’. That means although there exist such misclassifications on some photos,
this will not prevent the PhotoSafer from prompting alerts to user.
Table 5.10: Confusion Matrix of Private Photo Classification
Prediction
Photo ID Legal Document Family Nude Public
A
ct
u
a
l Photo ID 265 4 2 0 0
Legal Document 2 92 0 0 0
Family 4 0 130 2 0
Nude 5 0 10 94 0
5.5.3 Photo Content Classification Time
As presented in Section 5.3, in order to avoid affecting user experience, we store the
classification results of all stored photos in a photo content database. We measure the time
for retrieving one record of a specific photo from the database, compared with the time for
making a classification of that photo in real time. We run a total of 10 trials for each of 100
randomly selected photos, and the average time cost is described in Table 5.11. It shows
the time cost of the database-based approach is 38 time less than that of running real-time
classifications.
Table 5.11: Time Cost for Obtaining Photo Content Classification Result: From Database
vs. Real-Time Classification
Method Time
From Database 5.2 ms
Real-Time Classification 190.7 ms
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5.6 Discussion
Even though we implemented a prototype system, we did not integrate it into Android
kernel as originally designed. This section discusses the limitations of the current design and
implementation, and how it can be improved in the next step of research.
Kernel Interposition. In our current prototype system, we implemented a func-
tion to simulate apps that may access photos under different system status and app-running
status in the real world. This is the only way the prototype can interpose photo access and
monitor which specific photo is being accessed. Otherwise, the prototype system requires
the root privilege in the Android system, which is not safe for user to install such software.
However, as described in Section 5.3, the best way is to implement photo access interpo-
sition in the Android kernel. Since photos are accessed as regular files in Android, all file
access should be interposed. Additionally, the kernel interposition needs to determine if the
accessed file is a photo through checking file extension (e.g., .jpg)., so that the system can
decide in the kernel whether the accessed file needs our proposed access control.
App Whitelist. In the current system design, we determine whether a photo access
by a specific app is ‘unauthorized’ based the system status and app-running status, which
can cover most cases. However, in some cases, users are satisfied with some apps that are
running in the background access photos. For instance, some users allow the Google Photos
app to backup the stored photos even if it is running in the background. To consider such
cases, the current system design can be improved by adding an app whitelist. It allows users
to specify which apps can be granted access to all stored photos without the proposed access
control.
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5.7 Related Work
Android Permissions The Android platform offers users two approaches to control
permissions. Before Android 6.0 (Marshmallow), apps are required to disclose the full list
of resources that an app wants to access at installation. Users must grant all requested
permissions, otherwise the installation will be aborted. Some work [2, 23] has shown that few
users pay attention to and really understand the meaning of install-time permissions. After
Android 6.0, users need to grant permissions only when an app requests a sensitive resource
for the first use. This scheme can offer users contextual clues about why the requested
resource is necessary for an app. However, it does not account for the fact that the user’s
preference for subsequent permission requests might be varied under different contextual
circumstances.
Work has been done on permission models [2, 24, 25, 26, 27], which found users
usually do not know how apps access sensitive resources and how such access is managed.
Shih et al. [28] showed that privacy information is more likely to be leaked when users are
unaware of the purpose for requesting a specific sensitive resource.
Almuhimedi et al. analyzed AppOps, which is a permission manager introduced in
Android 4.3 but removed in Android 4.4.2 [29]. AppOps allowed users to review and modify
app permissions after apps were installed. They provided both qualitative and quantitative
evidence that the permission manager can increase users’ awareness of privacy risks. Even
though AppOps was removed from Android, a new permission management system was
introduced in Android 6.0, which allows users to review all permissions that an app has been
granted. However, since it is hidden in the deep level of the Settings app, it is not easy for
average users to discover it. There exist several third-party permission management apps,
such as XPrivacy [30], DonkeyGuard [31], Permission Manager [32] and Privacy Guard [33].
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However, these apps require additional privileges to support their functionalities, since there
is no official approach offered to third-party apps to modify the permission system. For
example, XPrivacy requires an unlocked bootloader and a custom recovery partition. Such
restrictions are needed to protect the permission system against interfering by malicious
apps.
Photo Privacy Ra et al. [34] designed a system P3 to protect privacy of photos
when they are shared on online social networks. He et al. [35] proposed an approach
to protect users’ privacy for photo sharing. Jana et al. [36] proposed a system Darkly
based on OpenCV library, which protect users’ private information from continuously-sensing
applications. Templeman et al. [37] implemented a system PlaceAvoider to protect visual
privacy by identifying sensitive places in video streams. Tan et al. [11] designed an access
control scheme to protect private photos on mobile phones, but it only depends on pre-stored
faces on mobile phones, which can only provide limited protection. However, PhotoSafer can
protect broad types of private photos. Zerr et al. [20] collected a photo dataset from Flickr
with labeled as public, private or undecided. Then, they extracted low-level features and
trained a SVM model to identify private photos. Squicciarini et al. [38] et al. conducted
an extensive study based on Flickr dataset collected by Zerr et al., and developed learning
models to estimate adequate privacy settings for shared photos in online social networks.
Similar to work by Zerr et al., Liu et al. [39] recruited workers to label photos collected
from Facebook as share with “only me”, “some friends”, “all friends”, “friends of friends”
and “everyone”. They found that there is a big difference between the actual labels on
Facebook and labels obtained from workers. The difference is due to Facebook users usually
sharing photos using the default privacy setting. Consequently, the default privacy setting
on Facebook is much lower than the privacy protection that users desire.
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5.8 Summary
Motivated by a user survey and analysis of 200 apps’ permission requests, both of
which showed the potential risk of private photos being leaked without being known, we
proposed a system PhotoSafer to protect private photos that are stored on mobile phones
from being accessed without users’ awareness. The access control on those private photos
is enforced by checking the system status and photo content. A mobile-compatible private
photo classifier was designed with transfer learning. We implemented a prototype system,
and evaluated its performance and cost through experiments.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we proposed a set of systems to protect people’s privacy in photo
taking and accessing.
In Chapter 2, we proposed a mobile cooperative privacy protection system, called
PrivacyCamera, to protect the privacy of a stranger who is accidentally included in a photo
taken by mobile phones. The system can notify nearby strangers of the possible inclusion in
a photo and allow them to decide if to blur their faces in the photo. We designed techniques
to detect if a stranger requesting face blurring in in the photo or not based on GPS locations.
We implemented a prototype system on Nexus 5 smartphones, and evaluated the systems
performance and cost through experiments as well as field tests. Evaluations show that the
system can accurately detect the stranger and blur his face to protect his privacy with low
computation cost and power consumption.
In Chapter 3, we addressed the same privacy issue of protecting strangers’ privacy
in photo taking as in Chapter 2. Different from PrivacyCamera, we use facial attributes to
determine whether a stranger is in a photo or not instead of using GPS locations. Since
the selected facial attributes are relatively stable, if a person is in a photo, by comparing
the faces in the photo with his recent profile photo in facial attributes, the person can be
correctly matched to his face in the photo. Also, in photographing scenarios, it is not very
likely that the facial attributes of two nearby strangers are exactly same, since the number of
persons in a limited geographic area around the photographer is usually not large. Based on
facial attributes, we proposed a cooperative scheme PoliteCamera to protect the privacy of
strangers who are unintentionally included in photos taken by mobile phones. We designed
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a novel ABCNN structure to predict facial attributes. We implemented a prototype system
on Nexus 5 smartphones, and evaluated its performance through experiments. The accuracy
of the facial attributes prediction is better than the state of the art, and experimental
evaluations demonstrate that the system can effectively protect strangers’ privacy.
In Chapter 4, we proposed a feature-based model to distinguish the target from the
strangers in a photo. Based on this model, we can protect strangers’ privacy by automatically
detecting them and blurring their faces in the photo, and hence there is no need for the
cooperation between the photographer and the strangers compared with the solutions in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. We implemented the model based on different supervised learning
algorithms and compared their performance. Evaluations show that the feature-based model
can effectively tell the target from the stranger in a photo, and its performance is better than
that of the heuristic rule base approach. In addition, we explored how feature selections affect
the performance.
In Chapter 5, motivated by a user survey and analysis of 200 apps’ permission re-
quests, we designed a novel content-based context-aware private photo protection system
PhotoSafer, which provides real-time access control over private photos based on the photo
contents and context status of mobile phone. The specific sensitive information that a private
photo contains will be disclosed to users before the access is granted. A resource-friendly pri-
vate photo classifier was trained with transfer learning. The evaluations demonstrated that
PhotoSafer can provide reliable protection for private photos against unauthorized access.
6.2 Future Work
This dissertation proposed several systems to provide privacy protection for photo
taking and accessing over mobile phones. Besides collecting more datasets to better validate
the proposed systems, there are still many other issues that deserve further exploration. In
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the following, we discuss two future research directions.
• Privacy-Preseving Online Photo Sharing: Although we proposed several systems
to protect privacy in photo taking and accessing, we have not addressed privacy issues
in online photo sharing. Currently, photo sharing-supported online social networks
(Instagram, Flicker, Facebook or WeChat, etc.) are very popular, and many people
share their photos on them. However, when a user shares a photo that includes his
friends and strangers, the included friends and strangers may not want to be published
online due to their own privacy concern. Some works have been done to address this
issue [1, 2, 3, 4], but they require users to set a privacy policy for each photo, or do
not consider the privacy of strangers. Therefore, it is necessary to design a privacy-
preserving online photo sharing system, which has less burden of policy settings and
can protect the privacy of strangers in a photo.
• Personalized Privacy-Preserving Photo Accessing: Even though we have de-
signed the PhotoSafer to protect private photos from unauthorized access, the current
design can only protect several common types of private photos. Since different users
have different categorization of private photos, one research direction is to design per-
sonalized systems to protect user-specific private photos.
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